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Proactive Management of Pneumonia Epizootics in Bighorn Sheep in Montana
Chairperson: Mike Mitchell
Pneumonia epizootics are a major challenge for management of bighorn sheep (Ovis
canadensis), often causing high mortality and subsequent long-term impacts that may
continue for decades. There have been at least 22 epizootics in herds in Montana from
1979‒2013, including 1 that led to a herd’s extirpation, several that appear to be affecting
herds up to 3 decades later, and 11 in the last 6 years. The disease is complex and
associated risk factors are poorly understood. A lack of tools to help predict and
proactively manage risk of pneumonia epizootics in attempt to prevent die-offs has led to
reactive rather than proactive management. We developed risk and decision models to
facilitate proactive management of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep in Montana.
Our risk model identifies risk factors and addresses biological questions about risk. We
used Bayesian logistic regression with repeated measures to analyze 43 herds that
experienced 22 epizootics out of 637 herd years from 1979–2013. Within an area of high
risk for pathogen exposure (a herd’s distribution plus a 14.5-km buffer), a herd’s odds of
a pneumonia epizootic increased >1.5 times per additional unit of private land, >3.3 times
if domestic sheep or goats were used for weed control, and >10.2 times if the herd or its
neighbors had a pneumonia epizootic since 1979. A herd at medium density compared to
low had >5.2 times greater odds of a pneumonia epizootic, and at high density had nearly
15 times greater odds. Our decision model incorporates predictions from the risk model
and uses a structured decision making approach to help make more proactive decisions
about how to best manage herds, given herd-specific probabilities of pneumonia
epizootics and management objectives. The model addresses uncertainty, risk tolerance,
and the multi-objective nature of management of bighorn sheep while providing a
consistent, transparent, and deliberative approach for making decisions. The risk and
decision models are unique tools that will help wildlife agencies more proactively address
pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep while providing a case study for developing
similar tools for proactive management of other wildlife diseases.
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CHAPTER 1:
INTRODUCTION TO PROACTIVE MANAGEMENT
OF PNEUMONIA EPIZOOTICS IN BIGHORN SHEEP IN MONTANA

Pneumonia epizootics are a major challenge for successful management and conservation
of bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis; Gross et al. 2000, Cahn et al. 2011, Wehausen et al.
2011, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013). Such epizootics often include high
mortality across all age classes, with implications for persistence of herds, satisfaction of
stakeholders, and resource allocation by management agencies (Enk et al. 2001, Montana
Fish, Wildlife and Parks [MFWP] 2010). Long-lasting effects include lamb die-offs and
other sporadic pneumonia outbreaks that may continue for decades (Enk et al. 2001,
Cassirer and Sinclair 2007, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013) and require
extensive management such as culling (Edwards et al. 2010), augmentations (MFWP
2010), and reintroductions (Singer et al. 2000). In some cases, herds may never fully
recover to pre-epizootic abundance and health (e.g., Enk et al. 2001, MFWP 2010,
Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013).
Due to a lack of tools to predict and proactively manage risk of pneumonia
epizootics, a reactive “crisis management” response is typical following epizootic events
(Woodroffe 1999, Mitchell et al. 2013). Despite many previous studies on pneumonia in
bighorn sheep, risk factors that contribute to pneumonia epizootics remain unclear, as
does an understanding of how available data are associated with potential risk factors and
how these data could help predict epizootics. Importantly too, a means to estimate risk
would not automatically imply appropriate proactive management to reduce that risk.
1

We developed risk and decision models to facilitate proactive management of
pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep in Montana, based on prototypes from Mitchell et
al. (2013). Our first objective was to develop an empirical risk model of pneumonia
epizootics using available data that we hypothesized could contribute to epizootics in
bighorn sheep. Our second objective was develop a decision model to evaluate
consequences and trade-offs of potential alternative decisions given predictions of risk
and the objectives and constraints of managers.
Our purpose in Chapter 2 was to develop a risk model to predict probability of
pneumonia epizootics, identify risk factors, and answer biological questions about risk.
We developed the model by analyzing histories of 43 herds in Montana that experienced
22 epizootics out of 637 herd years from 1979–2013. Within an area of high risk (herd
distribution plus a 14.5-km buffer), odds of a pneumonia epizootic increased >1.5-fold
per additional unit of private land, >3.3-fold when domestic sheep or goats were used for
weed control in that area, and >10.2-fold if a herd or its neighbors within that area had a
previous epizootic since 1979. Herds at medium density had >5.2-fold greater risk
compared to when they were at low density and nearly 15-fold greater risk at high
density. Through further analysis, we found that odds were 0.4-fold per additional unit of
spring precipitation, as well. Our risk model provides 1-year predictions of probability of
a pneumonia epizootic, from which long-term predictions can be calculated for use in the
decision model.
Our purpose in Chapter 3 was to design and demonstrate a decision model to
identify the best way to manage risk of pneumonia epizootics and clarify the decision
based on structured decision making (Gregory et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013,
2

Mitchell et al. 2013). Structured decision making (SDM) helps identify deliberative,
transparent, and defensible management actions most likely to achieve desired outcomes
while accounting for multiple competing objectives, uncertainty, and risk tolerance
(Gregory et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013). Using the decision model, decisionmakers can develop portfolios of potential management alternatives for their herds,
predict risk, estimate consequences, identify risk attitude, determine weights for
objectives, and calculate overall support and trade-offs for each portfolio to identify the
recommended decision. In an analysis of representative herds, the model recommended
various types of proactive decisions to reduce risk. These decisions were relatively
insensitive to the model components we tested, meaning the recommended decisions
were robust and would be the best means to manage herds based on herd-specific risk,
objectives, and consequences.
The risk and decision models are unique tools that will help wildlife agencies
more proactively manage risk of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep. We designed
the models with a simple user interface for independent use, without a need for statistical
expertise, SDM expertise, or meetings and working groups typically relied upon for
SDM-based decision-making. An adaptive management approach will continuously
improve the models in the future and adapt them to local conditions as needed (Gregory
et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013). Ultimately, too, the models are examples of the
roles of risk and decision models for wildlife management. They provide a case study and
foundation for future modeling efforts that will ultimately yield a more effective
approach to address diverse management challenges, particularly wildlife disease issues.
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CHAPTER 2:
MODELING RISK OF PNEUMONIA EPIZOOTICS IN BIGHORN SHEEP
This is the accepted version of the following article: Sells, S. N., M. S. Mitchell, J. J. Nowak, P. M. Lukacs, N. J. Anderson, J. M.
Ramsey, J. A. Gude, and P. R. Krausman. 2015. Modeling risk of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep. Journal of Wildlife
Management 79:2, which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)1937-2817.

ABSTRACT Pneumonia epizootics are a major challenge for management of bighorn
sheep (Ovis canadensis) affecting persistence of herds, satisfaction of stakeholders, and
allocations of resources by management agencies. Risk factors associated with the
disease are poorly understood, making pneumonia epizootics hard to predict; such
epizootics are thus managed reactively rather than proactively. We developed a model for
herds in Montana that identifies risk factors and addresses biological questions about risk.
Using Bayesian logistic regression with repeated measures, we found that private land,
weed control using domestic sheep or goats, pneumonia history, and herd density were
positively associated with risk of pneumonia epizootics in 43 herds that experienced 22
epizootics out of 637 herd-years from 1979–2013. We defined an area of high risk for
pathogen exposure as the area of each herd distribution plus a 14.5-km buffer from that
boundary. Within this area, the odds of a pneumonia epizootic increased by >1.5 times
per additional unit of private land (unit is the standardized % of private land where global
x̅ = 25.58% and SD = 14.53%). Odds were >3.3 times greater if domestic sheep or goats
were used for weed control in a herd’s area of high risk. If a herd or its neighbors within
the area of high risk had a history of a pneumonia epizootic, odds of a subsequent
pneumonia epizootic were >10 times greater. Risk greatly increased when herds were at
high density, with nearly 15 times greater odds of a pneumonia epizootic compared to
when herds were at low density. Odds of a pneumonia epizootic also appeared to
decrease following increased spring precipitation (odds = 0.41 per unit increase, global x̅
6

= 100.18% and SD = 26.97%). Risk was not associated with number of federal sheep and
goat allotments, proximity to nearest herds of bighorn sheep, ratio of rams to ewes,
percentage of average winter precipitation, or whether herds were of native versus mixed
or reintroduced origin. We conclude that factors associated with risk of pneumonia
epizootics are complex and may not always be from the most obvious sources. The
ability to identify high-risk herds will help biologists and managers determine where to
focus management efforts and the risk factors that most affect each herd, facilitating more
effective, proactive management.
INTRODUCTION
Pneumonia epizootics present an important challenge for effective management of
bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis; Gross et al. 2000, Cahn et al. 2011, Wehausen et al.
2011, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013). Once pneumonia pathogens are
introduced to a population of bighorn sheep, initial all-age mortality can exceed 80%
(Enk et al. 2001, Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks [MFWP] 2010). The pathogens also
may become endemic, resulting in pneumonia outbreaks that can cycle for years to
decades (Enk et al. 2001, Cassirer and Sinclair 2007, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al.
2013). Of critical concern, lamb recruitment often remains chronically low for many
years following an epizootic, which further threatens a herd’s long-term persistence,
particularly if pre-epizootic abundance was low, mortality rates were high, or other
stochastic events (e.g., environmental or demographic) occur that further suppress or
push the herd to extinction (Woodroffe 1999, Singer et al. 2000c, Cassirer and Sinclair
2007, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013). Herds may require extensive
management to recover, including removal of diseased individuals (Edwards et al. 2010),
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augmentation from other herds (MFWP 2010), or reintroductions (Singer et al. 2000b).
Despite great outlays of time and expense in attempt to restore herds after a pneumonia
epizootic, they may never fully recover to pre-epizootic abundance and health (e.g., Enk
et al. 2001, MFWP 2010, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013).
Identifying causes and influences of pneumonia epizootics has been the goal of
extensive study; the etiology remains poorly understood, however, and the need for
further research is commonly cited (Monello et al. 2001; Cassaigne et al. 2010; Miller et
al. 2011, 2012). Presence of certain pathogens such as Mycoplasma ovipneumoniae and
Mannheimia haemolytica are likely indicative of risk (Miller et al. 2011; Besser et al.
2012a, b, 2013; Shanthalingam et al. 2014). After decades of research, however,
relationships between the various known and hypothesized risk factors affecting
transmission, spread, and susceptibility of the pathogens that lead to pneumonia remain
unclear. A single risk factor associated with all pneumonia epizootics has yet to be found,
if it exists (Miller et al. 2012). Elucidation of risk factors and novel management tools for
this complicated, much-debated management challenge and serious threat to persistence
of herds of bighorn sheep are much needed.
The central role of domestic sheep and goats in exposure to pathogens is well
documented; pathogen transmission from domestic to bighorn sheep is the only supported
hypothesis in experimental trials (Wehausen et al. 2011). Healthy captive bighorn sheep
sicken and die when penned with domestic sheep (Foreyt and Jessup 1982, Onderka and
Wishart 1988, Foreyt 1989, Lawrence et al. 2010) or after accidental contact with
domestic sheep (Foreyt and Jessup 1982). Analysis of pathogens in epizootics of freeranging bighorn sheep also supports the hypothesis that pathogens are transmitted
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between Old World Caprinae species and immunologically naïve bighorn sheep (Besser
et al. 2012b, 2013). Proximity of bighorn sheep to grazing allotments with domestic
sheep is associated with increased susceptibility to pneumonia (Monello et al. 2001) and
decreased persistence of the herd over time (Singer et al. 2000b, 2001; Epps et al. 2004;
Clifford et al. 2009; Carpenter et al. 2014). Contact with feral goats also appears to result
in exposure to pathogens (Rudolph et al. 2003). Contact with sheep or goats on
commercial and hobby farms or when sheep or goats are used for weed control (i.e.,
targeted grazing to manage noxious weeds) may result in exposure to pathogens (Miller
et al. 2011, 2012; Wild Sheep Working Group 2012). Evidence also suggests herds of
bighorn sheep are likely more interconnected than previously thought (Singer et al.
2000a, DeCesare and Pletscher 2006), and that proximity among herds may increase risk
of exposure to pneumonia pathogens through such connectivity (Onderka and Wishart
1984, George et al. 2008, Edwards et al. 2010, Besser et al. 2013).
Conditions other than comingling between bighorn sheep and domestic sheep or
goats may be associated with spread of and susceptibility to pneumonia pathogens,
because comingling does not always quickly lead to pneumonia epizootics and some
epizootics occur without known or confirmed contact (e.g., Onderka and Wishart 1984,
George et al. 2008, Edwards et al. 2010). Rams have a greater tendency than ewes to
make long movements (Singer et al. 2000b, DeCesare and Pletscher 2006, O’Brien et al.
2014), probably more so at relatively high densities (Singer et al. 2000a, Monello et al.
2001). Such movements increase their risk of contacting domestic sheep or other infected
herds and spreading pathogens upon return to their own herds (Onderka and Wishart
1984, George et al. 2008, Besser et al. 2013). High densities of bighorn sheep may also
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result in high rates of contact between individuals, increasing the rate of spread of
pathogens (Monello et al. 2001, Lafferty and Gerber 2002, Clifford et al. 2009). Disease
processes can also be influenced by complex environmental interactions, including those
that may place stress on the health and immune response of animals (Scott 1988,
Wobeser 2006). Harsh winters have been associated with disease events (Monello et al.
2001, MFWP 2010), and pneumonia incidence increases in the fall and winter (Cassirer
and Sinclair 2007). Harsher winter conditions may stress animals by affecting energy
budgets or reducing access to adequate forage (Goodson et al. 1991, Butler et al. 2013).
Low precipitation has been linked to lower lamb survival (Portier et al. 1998) and to herd
extinctions (Epps et al. 2004), perhaps because dry growing seasons might increase
susceptibility to disease through decreased forage quality (Enk et al. 2001, Monello et al.
2001). Herds that are augmented or reintroduced appear to be at higher risk of pneumonia
than native herds, perhaps because of factors associated with reintroduction, the source
herd, or the possibility that sites where herds were previously extirpated are more risky
for pneumonia than where herds have not died out (Monello et al. 2001, Rudolph et al.
2007, Plowright et al. 2013).
Several models have been developed to simulate impacts of pneumonia from
exposure to allotments, distance to domestic sheep, or contact with nearby infected herds
of bighorn sheep and to predict population size, mortality rates, or herd persistence in
relation to pneumonia (Gross et al. 2000, Clifford et al. 2009, Cassaigne et al. 2010, Cahn
et al. 2011, Carpenter et al. 2014). Recent models also estimate the overall probability of
transitioning between healthy and all-age, lamb-only, or adult-only pneumonia (Cassirer
et al. 2013) and immune response by modeling how pneumonia exposure affects an
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individual’s risk of dying from pneumonia (Plowright et al. 2013). Another recent model
estimates probability of contact between individual bighorn sheep and allotments with
domestic sheep and goats (O’Brien et al. 2014). Several models simulate the effect of
management actions, primarily focused on changing management of grazing allotments
(Clifford et al. 2009, Cahn et al. 2011, Carpenter et al. 2014) as well as modifying
habitat, colonization of new patches, or impacts of stochastic events (Gross et al. 2000).
These models predict the consequences of epizootics, but none predict risk of epizootics
for individual herds (but see Clifford et al. [2009] and Carpenter et al. [2014]).
Despite the breadth of previous studies on pneumonia in bighorn sheep, state
wildlife agencies generally do not have a clear understanding of risk factors contributing
to epizootics in herds they manage, how data available to them might be associated with
such risk factors, or how these data might be used to predict epizootics. Agencies need
risk assessment models to help prioritize herds and allocate limited resources to
proactively manage risk of disease (Mitchell et al. 2013). Such a model should capture
variability across the range of environmental conditions in which managed herds exist;
models developed under more limited spatial or temporal extents may have little
predictive power. Without such models, management of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn
sheep has historically been reactive, resulting in crisis management rather than proactive
prevention (Woodroffe 1999).
To begin addressing this issue, Mitchell et al. (2013) developed a preliminary
pneumonia risk model and proactive decision model for bighorn sheep in Montana. The
goal of the risk model was to predict the likelihood of pneumonia epizootics for herds
managed by Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks (MFWP). The predictions were then used
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to inform the decision model designed to facilitate proactive management decisions given
the objectives and constraints of managers. Their risk model was based only on expert
opinion of biologists and managers and did not attempt to empirically quantify risk
factors associated with pneumonia epizootics. Our objective, therefore, was to develop an
empirical risk model of pneumonia epizootics using readily available data that we
hypothesized could contribute to epizootics in bighorn sheep, based on previous work.
Our model was designed to facilitate making herd-specific predictions and decisions
regarding epizootic risk as part of comprehensive statewide management of bighorn
sheep herds in Montana (Fig. 2.1). We used decision curve analysis (Vickers and Elkin
2006, Steyerberg et al. 2010) to evaluate the capacity of our model to inform such
decisions. This analysis allowed us to assess our model’s relative capacity for separating
high-risk herds from low-risk herds and the relative merits of using reactive or proactive
management of all herds in the absence of a predictive model.
STUDY AREA
Populations of bighorn sheep are found in western Montana and in portions of the
Missouri Breaks in central Montana (Fig. 2.1). Habitat characteristics vary widely across
these regions. Elevations range from 600 m to 4,000 m (MFWP 2010). Northwestern
Montana is characterized by dense forests and generally rugged and mountainous terrain
with a climate typical of the Pacific Northwest. Southwestern Montana is characterized
by rolling foothills and rugged mountains, with heavier snow cover on western aspects,
rain shadows on eastern aspects, and shrubs and bunchgrasses leading to conifers and
alpine vegetation at increasing elevations. West-central Montana is characterized by low
rolling hills and rugged mountain canyons, with a transitional mix of climate
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characteristics typical of southwestern and eastern Montana. South-central Montana
includes sheer mountain canyons and rolling hills with shrub desert, montane forest,
intermountain grasslands, alpine plateaus, and widely varying climates. The Missouri
Breaks is semiarid with flat or rolling benchlands, rugged badlands, riparian areas, and
ponderosa pine (Pinus ponderosa) savannahs. Federal sheep and goat grazing allotments
have been distributed throughout Montana for the past 3 decades except in the
northwestern region. Weed control with domestic sheep and goats has occurred
throughout the state, as have commercial and hobby farms on private lands that can
include domestic sheep and goats.
METHODS
Survey Data for Bighorn Sheep
We developed a disease risk model using survey and management data for 43 of 52
bighorn sheep herds in Montana from 1979 to 2013 (9 herds were not consistently
monitored). We selected 1979 as the preliminary year because data from monitoring
surveys and pneumonia epizootics were rare prior to that time. We defined a herd as a
group of bighorn sheep that generally form a spatially and demographically distinct group
(Wells and Richmond 1995). Not all 43 herds were extant in all years; 9 were established
after 1979, 1 of which was extirpated after a pneumonia epizootic. Survey data included
air and ground observations of bighorn sheep counts, age classifications, and sex
classifications collected at intervals that varied from intermittent to annual, depending on
the herd. These observations were primarily collected by MFWP (>90% of all years
surveyed). Additional observations were collected jointly between MFWP and the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT; <3%), by the CSKT (<2%), or in
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association with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (<4%), Bureau of Land
Management (BLM; <1%), or the University of Montana (<1%; Fralick 1984).
We defined herd-year as 1 July to 30 June following MFWP’s definition for a
management year, which encompasses a complete reproductive cycle from breeding
through lambing. We defined a pneumonia epizootic as a die-off with ≥25% mortality
(Young 1994) caused by pneumonia (n = 22; Fig. 2.1) based on data and expertise from
herd biologists and disease specialists at the MFWP Wildlife Laboratory. We included
mortalities due to culling of symptomatic bighorn sheep during verified pneumonia
events (Edwards et al. 2010). Pneumonia was generally confirmed by necropsy and
histological examination of lung tissue, culture, and/or pathology reports (n = 18). One
die-off was attributed to pneumonia based on biologist knowledge and information
presented in Enk et al. (2001). When carcasses or biological samples were unavailable
from an epizootic event (n = 3), pneumonia was determined based on other evidence
(drops of ≥25% in survey numbers, numerous reports of symptomatic individuals, reports
of carcasses, and detection of Mycoplasma ovipneumoniae in survivors the year
following the die-offs; Brent Lonner, MFWP, unpublished data). For each herd
experiencing a pneumonia epizootic (n = 18), we excluded the 3 following herd-years
from analysis because most herds continued to experience noticeable mortality rates in
the few years immediately following the preliminary epizootic year (MFWP 2010). We
also excluded all herd-years following a pneumonia epizootic if a herd was augmented
with animals from other herds because the need for augmentation meant that the herd was
not recovering well, and the addition of animals confounded mortality rates and signs of
recovery from the epizootic (n = 5 herds). We excluded herd-years where die-offs were
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caused by winter storms (n = 1) or unknown factors (n = 2). As with the 3 herd-years
after pneumonia epizootics, we excluded the 3 herd-years following die-offs caused by
unknown factors because they may have been pneumonia epizootic events.
Conceivably, pneumonia epizootics could have gone undetected between 1979
and 2013. To address this possibility and separate years with pneumonia epizootics from
those without, we calculated percentage change in survey counts between consecutive
herd-years for each herd. We classified herd-years as free of pneumonia epizootics by the
following criteria: 1) for herds surveyed annually, the herd had grown, declined <25%, or
declined ≥25% followed by ≥200% growth the next year; 2) when surveys occurred
every 2 years, the herd grew between surveys; and 3) when surveys occurred every 3
years, the herd grew by ≥200% between surveys. When calculating percentage change,
we excluded harvested animals, documented vehicle mortalities, and additions and
removals due to transplantation to analyze unexplained change only. Out of 1,333 herdyears available, we used 637 (x̅ = 14.8 herd-yr per herd, SD = 8.65, range = 1–34) for
analysis including the 22 herd-years with pneumonia epizootics. Largely because of a
lack of survey data, we excluded remaining herd-years from analysis because of
uncertainty of whether herd-years could safely be classified as free of epizootics.
Risk Factor Covariates
We selected 10 covariates we hypothesized were predictive of pneumonia epizootics in
Montana and for which sufficient data were available. Many covariates were spatial,
based on herd distributions, so we obtained agency records and elicited expert opinion of
agency biologists to delineate approximate boundaries of distributions of herds in each
herd-year (Conroy and Peterson 2013). We categorized each covariate as a potential risk
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factor we hypothesized could primarily contribute to 1) risk of exposure to pathogens, 2)
risk of spread of pathogens, or 3) susceptibility to pneumonia epizootics (Mitchell et al.
2013).
Risk of exposure to pathogens.—We hypothesized 5 covariates were positively
related to risk of pathogen transmission: proximity to number of domestic sheep and goat
allotments (Singer et al. 2000b, 2001; Monello et al. 2001; Epps et al. 2004; Clifford et
al. 2009), amount of private land (Miller et al. 2011, 2012; Wild Sheep Working Group
2012), use of domestic sheep and goats for weed control (Miller et al. 2012, Wild Sheep
Working Group 2012), a history of a pneumonia epizootic in the herd or its neighbors
(Onderka and Wishart 1984, George et al. 2008, Edwards et al. 2010, Besser et al. 2013),
and close proximity to other herds (Onderka and Wishart 1984, Singer et al. 2000a,
George et al. 2008, Edwards et al. 2010, Besser et al. 2013). We hypothesized that
amount of private land would be representative of risk from hobby or commercial farms
with domestic sheep or goats, for which data were not available. For each herd, we
estimated an area of high risk for pathogen exposure (distribution of the herd plus a 14.5km buffer from that perimeter; Wild Sheep Working Group 2012) using a geographical
information system (GIS; ArcMap 10.1, Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc.,
Redlands, CA). For the first 4 covariates, we modeled risk of pathogen exposure within
each area of high risk using 1) number of federally managed sheep and goat allotments,
2) percentage of private land, 3) knowledge of the wildlife biologist responsible for the
herd regarding the use of domestic sheep or goats for weed control, and 4) history of a
pneumonia epizootic in the herd in a previous herd-year, or a current or previous
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pneumonia epizootic in a neighboring herd within the area of high risk. We calculated
average proximity to the 3 closest herds for the covariate of herd proximity.
We interviewed personnel and consulted records of federal and state agencies to
gather data on allotments, private land, weed control, neighbor risk, and herd proximity
(Table 2.1). For data on allotments, we interviewed agency personnel and obtained BLM
allotment bills from 1988 onward from the Rangeland Administration System (RAS). We
obtained associated geospatial data on allotments from each agency and determined the
number of allotment boundaries intersected by each area of high risk using a GIS (x̅ =
0.54, SD = 1.32 for 565 herd-yr with allotment data). For private land, we obtained land
ownership data and calculated the amount of private land within each area of high risk
using a GIS (x̅ = 25.58, SD = 14.53%). We obtained weed control data through elicitation
of expert opinion of agency biologists (13.97% of herd-yr had known weed control;
Conroy and Peterson 2013). We obtained neighbor risk and herd proximity data through
agency records and elicitation of expert opinion of agency biologists. For neighbor risk,
when a herd experienced a pneumonia epizootic we assumed neighboring herds were at
risk for that and subsequent herd-years. We also assumed a recurring risk to the initial
herd in all subsequent herd-years (19.31% of herd-yr had neighbor risk). For herd
proximity, we calculated the shortest distance to the perimeters of the distributions of the
nearest 3 bighorn sheep herds using a GIS and then calculated the average of those
distances (global x̅ = 22.65 km, SD = 24.27 km). We considered distributions from all
herds (including the 9 in Montana excluded from our primary analysis and several herds
in British Columbia, Idaho, and Wyoming) for our covariates of neighbor risk if they
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were within the area of high risk and herd proximity if they were 1 of the 3 closest herds
to any of our 43 primary herds.
Risk of spread of pathogens.—We hypothesized high ram:ewe ratios represented
increased risk of rams wandering, encountering, and spreading pathogens (Onderka and
Wishart 1984, Singer et al. 2000a, Monello et al. 2001, George et al. 2008, Besser et al.
2013), and that higher relative density increased risk through greater rates of spread of
pathogens (Monello et al. 2001, Lafferty and Gerber 2002, Clifford et al. 2009). We
obtained herd survey data from the Montana Bighorn Sheep Conservation Strategy
(MFWP 2010) and directly from biologists (Table 2.1). For ram:ewe ratios (x̅ = 0.65, SD
= 0.39), we excluded ratios from analysis where <80% of observed animals were
classified by sex, recorded ratios did not match adults counted, or <1 ram or ewe was
counted (n = 50 excluded ratios associated with included herd-yr). To estimate herd
density in each year, we divided the total number of animals counted by the area of the
herd’s distribution. We then calculated average density, yearly percentage of average
density, and the range in percentage of average density for each herd. We assigned each
herd’s density estimate into 3 equally sized bins of low, medium, and high based on the
percentage of average density relative to their 1979–2013 range. Thus, each set of cutoffs were herd-specific, based on historical densities of each herd (x̅ cut-off for low
density ≤ 92.15% of average, SD = 13.15; x̅ cut-off for medium density ≤ 151.11% of
average, SD = 31.02; 43.80% herd-yr had low density, 36.42% medium, and 19.78%
high). When density estimates were not available for years without pneumonia
epizootics, we excluded those herd-years from analysis (n = 65 of excluded herd-yr).
When density estimates were unavailable for years with pneumonia epizootics (n = 3), we
18

used the most recent density estimate prior to the epizootic (n = 2), or estimated density
based on reports of percent declines (n = 1). We used a 1-year lag for both covariates
because surveys were usually done in spring and thus represented the minimum number
of animals likely to be present at the start of the following herd-year.
Susceptibility to pneumonia epizootics.—We hypothesized that relatively harsh
winters contributed to susceptibility to pneumonia epizootics by draining energy budgets
(Goodson et al. 1991, Monello et al. 2001, Butler et al. 2013). We used percentage of 30year normal precipitation to represent winter severity. We hypothesized that relatively
dry springs contributed to susceptibility to pneumonia epizootics by decreasing forage
quality (Portier et al. 1998, Enk et al. 2001, Monello et al. 2001, Epps et al. 2004) and
used percentage of 30-year normal precipitation to represent dry spring conditions.
Lastly, we hypothesized that mixed (i.e., native herds augmented with animals from other
populations) or non-native (reintroduced) herds had increased susceptibility to
pneumonia epizootics because these sites might be more risky if conditions that
contributed to a previous herd reduction or extirpation persisted in the area (Monello et
al. 2001). For winter and spring precipitation, we calculated percentage of normal
precipitation using a GIS to determine monthly PRISM precipitation values and 1980–
2010 Normals (PRISM Climate Group, Corvallis, Oregon) in each delineated herd
distribution (winter x̅ = 98.68%, SD = 30.16%; spring x̅ = 100.18%, SD = 26.97%).
Similar to Butler et al. (2013) but because spring lambing season began in April in some
herds, we considered winter to be 1 November–31 March, and spring 1 April–30 June.
We used a 1-year lag for both effects to capture the influence of the most recent winter
and spring on the next herd-year (Portier et al. 1998, Butler et al. 2013). For herd origin,
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we obtained agency transplant records (Table 2.1) to determine in each herd-year if herds
were native (21.82% of herd-yr), mixed (20.25%), or reintroduced (57.93%).
Development of Risk Model
Analysis of competing models.—We developed 30 a priori models to test how our
hypothesized risk factors predicted pneumonia epizootics (Appendix). We analyzed the
models in a Bayesian framework to allow for modeling of missing values and associated
uncertainty and to simplify the use of herd-level random effects due to repeated
measurements (Kéry 2010). We centered and scaled covariate data and tested for
correlations between continuous covariates; we did not include covariates with >40%
correlation in the same model (Dormann et al. 2013). We used JAGS (Version 3.3.0,
http://mcmc-jags.sourceforge.net, accessed 14 Mar 2013) called through R (Version
2.13.1, www.r-project.org, accessed 10 Sep 2011) using the package R2jags (Version
0.02–17, http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=R2jags, accessed 14 Mar 2013) to run the
logistic regression models (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000) from these data, with repeated
measures and a random effect for herd (Gelman and Hill 2007, Royle and Dorazio 2008,
Kéry 2010). We used vague, uniform priors for all parameters (Link et al. 2002). We
modeled missing values for ram:ewe ratios (n = 84) and number of domestic sheep and
goat allotments (n = 72) by setting priors equal to the herd mean where available or the
global mean otherwise. We ran 100,000 Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) iterations
with 3 chains, discarding the first 25,000 iterations as burn-in (Link et al. 2002). We
evaluated convergence of the MCMC simulation with the Gelman and Rubin
̂ ; Brooks and Gelman 1998) and visual inspection of the
convergence diagnostic (R
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posteriors and chains for mixing (Link and Barker 2010) to ensure convergence for
accurate estimates of parameters.
We identified top models based on Deviance Information Criterion (DIC;
Spiegelhalter et al. 2002). We excluded models >10 ∆DIC from further consideration.
We considered covariates within each model to be fully supported if the 95% credibility
interval posterior densities (CRIs; Kéry 2010) did not include 0. Where 95% CRIs
included 0, we identified the broadest CRI that would exclude 0 to investigate uncertainty
of the covariate.
We used a spreadsheet to calculate probability of a pneumonia epizootic for each
herd using the parameter estimates from the top models and covariate data from each
herd. The risk model provided probability of a pneumonia epizootic in any given year.
We calculated probability of ≥1 epizootic occurring in the next 10 years as {1 − [1 −
Pr(Epizootic1-yr )]10 } (Mood et al. 1974).
Assessment of model fit and usefulness.—We used decision curve analysis (DCA;
Vickers and Elkin 2006, Steyerberg et al. 2010) to compare net benefits of the top models
(<10 ∆DIC) to estimate fit of each model to the data and usefulness of the model. This
method allowed assessment of whether the top models were useful compared to totally
reactive (i.e., treat all herds as low risk) or totally proactive (i.e., treat all herds as high
risk) management of all herds, and the relative consequences of wrong predictions, which
is important because a false negative prediction is arguably more harmful for
conservation and public enjoyment of bighorn sheep than a false positive prediction. For
each model, risk of a pneumonia epizootic could be classified as high if it exceeded a predefined threshold probability (pt ). We evaluated a range of pt (0 to the value of the max.
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predicted probability of pneumonia epizootic for the 637 herd-yr from each model) for
which we calculated sensitivity, specificity, and net benefits,
net benefitmodel =

p
true positive count
false positive count
−
×( t )
𝑛
𝑛
1 − pt

to estimate and summarize performance and advantages of the model, where n = 637.
Weighting by the ratio pt ⁄(1 − pt ) accounts for the harm of false positive predictions to
harm of false negative predictions at each pt . For each model, we plotted decision curves
of the net benefits across values of pt to identify the best model that tended to have higher
net benefits than the others.
Finally, we determined if the best model was more useful than abandoning the
model and instead managing all herds as low risk, which is a management option in
absence of a predictive model. We calculated the model advantage across the range of
pt over the option of assuming all herds are low risk as:
net increase in true positives = net benefitmodel × 100
This measure of the model’s usefulness calculates the increase in true positives with no
increase in false positive per 100 estimates compared to treating all herds as low risk.
Similarly, the model advantage across the range of pt over the option of assuming all
herds are high risk is:
net reduction in false positives =

(net benefitmodel − net benefitall high ) × 100
pt ⁄(1 − pt )

The net reduction in false positives is the reduction of false positives per 100 estimates
provided by the risk model without increasing the number of false negatives compared to
abandoning the model and treating all herds as high risk. Here, net benefitall high is
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calculated with the net benefitmodel formula except true positive count is the total number
of pneumonia epizootic cases (22) and false positive count the total non-pneumonia
epizootic cases (615).
Second generation model.—We developed an a posteriori, second generation
model by calculating the inclusion probability of each covariate. Inclusion probabilities
resulted from introducing a Bernoulli distributed indicator variable with probability equal
to 0.5 (Ntzoufras 2009). We ran 3 chains for 500,000 iterations, discarding the first
125,000 iterations as burn-in (Link et al. 2002). We calculated the proportion of times
each indicator variable assumed a value of 1 and identified covariates with inclusion
probabilities >0.15 (similar to Ntzoufras 2009). We then evaluated a new second
generation model with these covariates using the techniques described above for analysis
of competing models.
RESULTS
Development of Risk Model
The top-ranked model included private land, weed control, neighbor risk, and density
(Table 2.2). The posterior density CRIs excluded 0 except for private land (95% CRI, –
0.03 ≤ x ≤ 0.91), but a 93% CRI for private land excluded 0 (0.01 ≤ x ≤ 0.87). The
second best model included neighbor risk and density (∆DIC = 6.9). Smooth unimodal
̂ values of <1.1 indicated
posteriors, history plots (Link and Barker 2010), and R
convergence (Brooks and Gelman 1998). All other models had ∆DIC > 10, so we
excluded them from further consideration.
The top-ranked model was superior to the second-ranked model based on
sensitivity, specificity, and net benefits. Sensitivity and specificity were simultaneously
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maximized for the top model at a pt of 0.0312, achieving 81.8% sensitivity, 80.2%
specificity, and a correct overall classification rate of 80.2% (Fig. 2.2). Sensitivity and
specificity for the second best model were simultaneously maximized at a pt of 0.0288
with 81.8% sensitivity, 75.3% specificity, and 75.5% correct overall classification rate.
We selected the top model as the final risk model because it had a higher overall net
benefit than the second model across most pt ’s (Fig. 2.3).
Based on DCA, over a wide range of pt the final risk model was superior to the 2
alternative options of treating all herds reactively or proactively in absence of a predictive
model. The risk model’s decision curve had higher net benefits than the decision curve
for the alternative of treating all herds as high risk at a pt of approximately ≥0.001 (Fig.
2.3). The risk model’s decision curve was also higher than the decision curve for treating
all as low risk at a pt of approximately ≤0.389. Between 0.001–0.389, the risk model
would therefore provide both a net reduction in false positive estimates over assuming all
herds are high risk and a net increase in true positives over assuming all herds are low
risk. Using the risk model with any pt between these levels would be better than fully
reactive management or the alternative of total proactive management of all herds,
considering limited resources. It is therefore useful as a model for predicting risk of
pneumonia epizootics at any pt within this range. The model would yield fewer false
negative predictions at low values of pt and fewer false positive predictions at high values
of pt (Table 2.3).
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Effect Sizes for Top Model
Parameters in the risk model provide estimated effects of each risk factor on probability
of a pneumonia epizootic. Holding other parameters constant, the odds of a pneumonia
epizootic increased 1.54 (95% CRI, 0.97 ≤ x ≤ 2.48) times per additional unit of private
land within the area of high risk (global x̅ = 25.58%, SD = 14.53%). Herds where
domestic sheep or goats were known to be used to control weeds within the area of high
risk that year had 3.35 (95% CRI, 1.12 ≤ x ≤ 9.59) times greater odds of a pneumonia
epizootic than those without. Odds of a pneumonia epizootic were 10.29 (95% CRI, 3.79
≤ x ≤ 29.73) times greater for herds if they or their neighbors in the area of high risk
previously experienced a pneumonia epizootic. Herds at medium or high density had
odds of a pneumonia epizootic 5.26 (95% CRI, 1.36 ≤ x ≤ 24.05) and 14.86 (95% CRI,
3.79 ≤ x ≤ 70.74) times greater, respectively, than when they were at low density.
Altogether, a herd with no private land, weed control, or neighbor risk and with low
density was estimated to have 0.0009 (95% CRI, 0.0001≤ x ≤ 0.0045) probability of a
pneumonia epizootic during any year and represents the least risky extreme. On the most
risky extreme, a herd in an area of high risk with 100% private land, weed control,
neighbor risk, and high density was estimated to have 0.8992 (95% CRI, 0.4256 ≤ x ≤
0.9910) annual probability of a pneumonia epizootic.
Second Generation Model
Inclusion probabilities were >0.15 for private land, weed control, neighbor risk, and
density, which aligns with the top model we developed a priori. A fifth and final
covariate with >0.15 inclusion probability was spring precipitation. An a posteriori model
with these 5 covariates had a DIC of 4 lower than that of our original best model,
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indicating greater support for the new model. Parameter estimates of the original 4 risk
factors were very similar (Tables 2.2 and 2.4).
Spring precipitation was negatively correlated with probability of a pneumonia
epizootic the next herd-year (starting 1 Jul). Holding other parameters constant, odds of a
pneumonia epizootic were 0.41 (95% CRI, 0.20 ≤ x ≤ 0.78) times that of years of average
spring precipitation per standardized unit increase (x̅ = 100.18%, SD = 26.97%). Thus,
each increase of 27% from average precipitation was associated with less than half the
odds of a pneumonia epizootic compared to years with average spring precipitation.
Conversely, for each unit decrease in spring rainfall, risk of a pneumonia epizootic more
than doubled.
DISCUSSION
Historically, state wildlife agencies have managed pneumonia epizootics in bighorn
sheep largely reactively because they have not had the ability to predict epizootics.
Existing models related to pneumonia in bighorn sheep focus largely on predicting
consequences of epizootics (e.g., mortality rates and population persistence). Our model
was designed to predict the risk of pneumonia epizootics before they happen, which no
other model has directly done before (although see Clifford et al. [2009] and Carpenter et
al. [2014] for models of disease transmission from allotments). If probability of
epizootics cannot be predicted, herds cannot be separated by high and low risk to
proactively prevent pneumonia epizootics. Proactively treating all herds as high risk
would likely be prohibitively expensive, resulting in the general reactive management
status quo.
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A more proactive approach integrating wildlife health with wildlife conservation
would lead to more effective conservation and management of wildlife populations
(Deem et al. 2001). For more proactive management of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn
sheep, agencies need risk assessment tools to better understand risk factors that contribute
to pneumonia epizootics. They also need to know how to use available data to predict
pneumonia epizootics. Models based on more limited temporal and spatial extents may
make more precise estimates on such scales, but lose generality across larger ones. A
general model that combines information from herds across a state would aid in
prediction of risk at the necessary scale for state wildlife agencies to make decisions on
how to allocate resources for proactive management. Accordingly, we analyzed epizootic
histories and potential risk factors for 43 herds across Montana from 1979–2013 to create
a statewide risk model for pneumonia.
Risk Factors
Risk of pneumonia epizootics was positively associated with greater amount of private
land, weed control with domestic sheep and goats, history of a pneumonia epizootic in a
herd or a nearby herd, and higher density. Based on our second generation model, risk
also appeared to be associated with spring precipitation. Risk was not associated with
number of allotments, herd proximity, ram:ewe ratios, winter precipitation, or herd
origin, nor did a single risk factor affect all pneumonia epizootics based on our
multivariate model. Although the existence of a single risk factor that we did not evaluate
cannot be ruled out, our results agree with the findings of Miller et al. (2012) in their
review of hypothesized risk factors of die-offs in bighorn sheep. They failed to find
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evidence of a single etiological agent and concluded that predictive models of epizootics
are needed based on the likely complexity of the etiology of such outbreaks.
Risk of exposure to pathogens.—As we hypothesized, greater percentage of
private land in and near areas used by herds of bighorn sheep was associated with
increased risk of pneumonia epizootics by >1.5-fold per additional unit of private land.
Risk associated with contact with domestic livestock on private land has not previously
been quantified and tends to be neglected (Miller et al. 2011, 2012), perhaps because data
on locations of hobby and commercial farms are generally unavailable and would be
highly fluid through time. Exposure to sheep or goats may occur on farms on private
lands, whereas exposure on public lands likely occurs primarily on allotments, for which
data exist and which agencies can more directly manage. Although risk due to private
land was slightly uncertain (the 95% CRI contained 0, however the 93% CRI did not),
these results provide the first empirical support for the suggestions of Miller et al. (2011,
2012) and the Wild Sheep Working Group (2012) that risk of exposure to pathogens on
private land should receive more focus and concern. The uncertainty of this parameter at
the 95% CRI is likely due to the probably low correlation between private land and farms
with domestic sheep and goats, because not every parcel of private land contains
domestic Caprinae species. Were data available, the effect of commercial and hobby
farms could likely be estimated more precisely, yet the readily available percentage of
private land was still predictive of risk. Examples of management actions to reduce risk
associated with private land might include public education on separation of bighorn
sheep and domestic sheep and goats, removal of wandering bighorn sheep in proximity to
farms with domestic sheep or goats (Mitchell et al. 2013), or purchasing conservation
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easements (Sells 2014). We note that the association between private land and pneumonia
epizootics could also be related to high human densities or human disturbance (e.g.,
development) on some areas of private land. Such disturbances could increase stress and
potentially predispose herds to pneumonia epizootics.
Our hypothesis that risk of pneumonia epizootics increases when domestic sheep
and goats are used for weed control in or near areas occupied by herds of bighorn sheep
was supported, with a >3.3-fold increase in risk compared to areas or years without
known weed control using domestic Caprinae species. To our knowledge, our results are
the first to support the suggestion by Miller et al. (2012) and the Wild Sheep Working
Group (2012) that such operations increase risk of pathogen exposure. Potential
management actions to mitigate this risk include public education about separation
between bighorn sheep and domestic sheep and goats (Mitchell et al. 2013), managing
timing of grazing to avoid temporal overlap with bighorn sheep, or using other methods
to control weeds that do not involve domestic sheep or goats (Sells 2014).
As we hypothesized, risk of pneumonia epizootics increased for a herd when that
herd or a nearby herd within 14.5 km had a history of a pneumonia epizootic. Increased
risk for a herd after an epizootic is intuitive. Evidence suggests that pathogens become
endemic and may cycle for years to decades within herds (Enk et al. 2001, Cassirer and
Sinclair 2007, Cassirer et al. 2013). Further evidence suggests that whereas ewes may
develop temporary protective immunity, this may wane after exposure to pathogens and
does not effectively transfer to lambs, leading to ongoing outbreaks of pneumonia
(Plowright et al. 2013). Additionally, Plowright et al. (2013) found that translocated,
naïve adults appear to be at particularly high risk of dying from pneumonia. We
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hypothesized that other naïve individuals in nearby herds may be at a similar risk of
contracting pneumonia. Whereas the exposure and spread of pathogens to nearby herds
has been hypothesized to contribute to epizootics (Onderka and Wishart 1984, George et
al. 2008, Edwards et al. 2010), this risk has not been quantified or received as much focus
as other hypothesized risk factors. We found that a pneumonia epizootic was associated
with >10-fold risk of pneumonia epizootics for all herds within 14.5 km. Cassirer et al.
(2013) reported a slight but uncertain increase in probability of pneumonia for
neighboring populations located <20 km apart if a neighbor had any pneumonia
mortalities that or the previous year. The reason for this difference may be attributable to
an inclusion of short timeframes with all cases of pneumonia as opposed to our use of
longer timeframes with high-mortality epizootics. We included histories of epizootics
from 1979 to the end of the study given the evidence that pathogens can cycle for decades
(Enk et al. 2001, Cassirer et al. 2013). We included only high-mortality epizootics
because we hypothesized that pneumonia widely spread in a herd would be linked to
more potential exposure between herds (Onderka and Wishart 1984, George et al. 2008,
Edwards et al. 2010, Besser et al. 2013), compared to limited cases of pneumonia that
may result in less exposure between herds. Thus, across broad temporal and spatial
scales, we conclude that pneumonia epizootics have long-term consequences for herds
experiencing epizootics and for neighboring herds as well. Potential actions that may
reduce this risk could include creating lethal removal zones between infected and naïve
herds, culling symptomatic individuals, and avoiding establishing new herds close to
those with epizootic histories (Sells 2014). Additionally, we note that past epizootics in
or near a herd could be predictive of future epizootics because of shared or recurring
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conditions in an area besides pathogens (e.g., environmental factors) that could make
herds more susceptible to pneumonia epizootics.
Our other hypothesis that proximity to other herds, measured by Euclidean
distance, increased risk of pathogen exposure was not supported. The global mean for
average proximity to the 3 closest herds (22.65 km, SD = 24.27 km) was >1.56 times
farther and highly variable compared to the maximum distance for those herds we
considered neighbors (within 14.5 km). Although bighorn sheep are known to move
distances comparable to our mean herd proximity (e.g., O’Brien et al. [2014] reported
that >10% of rams forayed ≥21.7 km from core herd home ranges each summer), this
does not mean they will necessarily come in contact with other herds. By not accounting
for barriers to movement, Euclidean distance may misrepresent distances that bighorn
sheep would actually travel between herds, particularly at greater distances. Additionally,
average distance to the 3 closest herds did not account for epizootic histories, whereas
our identified risk factor of neighboring herds with epizootic histories did. The
hypothesis Cassirer et al. (2013) tested for distance to nearest herd with recent cases of
pneumonia also allowed for herds at much greater distances (≤70 km) and did not have
support. Risk therefore appears to be associated with relatively close neighboring herds
with histories of pneumonia epizootics, not to Euclidean distance to herds in general.
Proximity to greater number of allotments was not predictive of pneumonia
epizootics, contrary to results reported by other researchers. Monello et al. (2001)
reported that herds with pneumonia were closer to domestic sheep allotments than were
herds without pneumonia. In their analysis, they included allotments at much greater
distances compared to our area of high risk. Clifford et al. (2009) estimated risk of
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pathogen transmission was higher where strong overlap existed between allotments and
known bighorn sheep movements. Our result is counter-intuitive because pneumonia in
bighorn sheep is strongly associated with exposure to domestic sheep and goats
(Wehausen et al. 2011), which is presumably more likely on allotments. In Montana,
however, mean number of allotments within 14.5 km of herds was only 0.54 per herdyear (SD = 1.32). Of herd-years with ≥1 allotment (n = 134), mean number was 2.29
allotments (SD = 1.83, max. = 14). Only 14 of the 43 herds were within 14.5 km of
allotments with sheep or goats for at least 1 year between 1979 and 2013; of these herds,
only 4 had pneumonia epizootics. Simple presence or absence of allotments within 14.5
km was not predictive of epizootics upon further investigation, either. For herds that are
close to allotments, exposure may further depend on numerous factors unique to each
allotment, including how they are managed (e.g., timing of grazing, management of
strays). It may also depend on the degree of actual overlap between species as suggested
by Clifford et al. (2009), for which we had no data commensurate with the large spatial
and temporal scales at which we worked. We suggest further, more detailed evaluation of
how allotments might contribute to risk of pneumonia epizootics is needed before
discarding allotments as a potentially predictive risk factor for future models.
Risk of spread of pathogens.—Our hypothesis that relative density within a herd is
associated with increased risk of a pneumonia epizootic was supported, lending empirical
support to the hypotheses of other researchers (Miller et al. 1991, Monello et al. 2001,
Clifford et al. 2009). Risk of a pneumonia epizootic increased >5-fold when herds were at
medium density and nearly 15-fold when herds were at high density compared to when
they were at low density. Substantial herd variation (e.g., habitat quality and estimated
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area used by each herd) yielded incomparable absolute densities between herds, so we
defined density as relatively low, medium, or high. More analysis on density would be
useful in the future, including what absolute values might lead to higher risk of
pneumonia epizootics, or if group aggregation size is predictive. Density is a component
of risk that has previously received little attention because the positive association
between risk of pneumonia and higher densities had not been quantified. The association
between higher herd density and risk may appear to contradict the idea that herds of
larger population size should be less threatened by extirpation than smaller herds
(Woodroffe 1999, Singer et al. 2001, Cassaigne et al. 2010). Rather than reducing herd
size only, expanding the distribution of an existing herd (e.g., through habitat
improvements that attract animals to new areas or, potentially, short-distance transplant
operations to unoccupied areas nearby) would also reduce density by increasing the total
area that a herd occupies (Sells 2014).
Ram:ewe ratios were not associated with increased risk. We chose these ratios to
represent the likelihood that rams would wander in search of breeding opportunities, thus
potentially encountering and spreading pathogens. Our results suggest that rams may not
be as important vectors of pathogens in their herds as we hypothesized. Rams are known
to make long movements (Singer et al. 2000b, DeCesare and Pletscher 2006, O’Brien et
al. 2014), probably even more so at relatively high densities (Singer et al. 2000a, Monello
et al. 2001). To increase risk of pneumonia for its herd, however, a wandering ram would
have to become infected, survive long enough to come in contact with other herd
members, and successfully transmit pathogens. These odds may be independent of
ram:ewe ratios alone. Historically, MFWP often removed wandering rams when
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discovered comingling with domestic sheep or goats, and this management effort may
have further reduced risk from wandering rams in specific cases. Additionally, not all age
classes of rams may be at greater risk of wandering. The ratio of young rams in a herd
may be more predictive of this potential source of risk of spread of pathogens, but these
data were only occasionally collected over the years we analyzed.
Susceptibility to pneumonia epizootics.—We used percentage of normal spring
(Apr‒Jun) precipitation to represent the hypothesized impact of decreased forage quality
on susceptibility to pneumonia epizootics but found no relationship during analysis of our
a priori models. This suggested that forage quality might not affect risk of pneumonia
epizootics, or that percentage of normal spring precipitation may not be a suitable index
to forage quality because it does not account for other environmental factors that also
affect forage quality (e.g., timing of precipitation and temperature). We think it more
likely, however, that this covariate did not have support because no a priori model
included it alongside the other identified risk factors. Based on our a posteriori, second
generation model, spring precipitation appeared predictive of pneumonia epizootics.
Odds of a pneumonia epizootic were reduced by a factor of 0.41 times per unit of spring
precipitation beyond average in the previous spring (x̅ = 100.18%, SD = 26.97%).
Monello et al. (2001) also noted qualitative evidence for a relationship between summer
and fall pneumonia outbreaks and lower than average precipitation. The second
generation model could be used to predict risk of pneumonia epizootics instead of our a
priori risk model; the effect sizes of the other 4 risk factors were comparable, with a
largest difference in any parameter estimate of <0.4 (Tables 2.2 and 2.4).
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We selected percentage of normal winter precipitation to represent the
hypothesized impact of harsh winters on susceptibility to pneumonia epizootics because
of increased energy expenditures but found no relationship. This result suggests that
harsh winters do not increase risk of pneumonia epizootics, consistent with similar results
of Monello et al. (2001). Alternatively, percentage of normal winter precipitation may not
have been a suitable index for the effects of harsh winters on energy budgets of bighorn
sheep because it did not account for patterns and timing of winter precipitation. These
factors could be important components of winter severity but related data were
unavailable at the scale of our analysis.
Herds in Montana of mixed or reintroduced origin did not have higher risk of
pneumonia epizootics than native herds. This finding contrasts with those of Monello et
al. (2001) who evaluated a subset of herds throughout North America and hypothesized
that sites of previous herd extirpations could continue to be risky for pneumonia based on
characteristics of the site itself. If this were the case, reintroduced herds at sites of
historical herd extirpations in Montana could have comparable risk to native herds. This
could be true because MFWP has tried to avoid reintroducing herds near areas with
domestic sheep. Alternatively, whereas we defined epizootics as events with ≥25%
mortality, Monello et al. (2001) defined all detected pneumonia events as epizootics
including those with <10% mortality. A difference in risk for native versus reintroduced
herds may have been more pronounced if reintroduced herds were more likely to
experience low-mortality pneumonia events. Reintroduced herds might also have been
monitored more closely, providing the ability to better detect low-mortality events.
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Overall Model
Availability of certain data limited our ability to analyze additional hypothesized risk
factors. Most important was the paucity of pathogen data. Presence of Mycoplasma
ovipneumoniae or Mannheimia haemolytica may be important in predicting risk if
sufficient data, understanding, and tests for disease agents were available. Although
Montana had over 60 herd-years of Mycoplasma ovipneumoniae data and nearly 100
herd-years of Mannheimia haemolytica data, more intensive, consistent efforts with
larger sample sizes would have been needed for our analysis because so many herd-years
were still lacking in data. Also, traditional culture-based methods for Mycoplasma
ovipneumoniae (Besser et al. 2008) and Mannheimia haemolytica (Shanthalingam et al.
2014) appear to miss many positive results compared to new culture-independent
methods that detect genetic signatures of the pathogen. This suggests that analysis of
these data for our study could lead to misleading and erroneous predictions; therefore, we
excluded them from analysis. In addition to pathogen data, body condition data such as
body fat levels, parasite loads, mineral levels, or blood parameters may also be of
potential value in a future risk model (Mitchell et al. 2013).
Evaluating our model’s capacity to predict future epizootics in Montana, or those
occurring in other states, offers an opportunity to evaluate and improve the model. It
would also constitute a test of the hypothesized relationships posed by our model and its
covariates, providing an opportunity to learn more about risk factors for pneumonia
epizootics. Our evaluation of 10 hypothesized risk factors clarified the importance of
poorly understood risk factors in Montana to better predict risk. These risk factors could
differ in their relative importance for herds in places unlike Montana. To maximize
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usefulness of the model, we recommend that potential variation in risk factors should be
tested and calibrated to local conditions as part of an adaptive approach to disease
management. Alternative risk factors may also be important in other areas and a subject
for future research toward development of predictive models elsewhere. The evidence,
based on our second generation model, that spring precipitation is predictive of
pneumonia epizootics deserves further attention in future work.
The scope and scale of our study required data collected from numerous
biologists, literature sources, and other agency personnel. Because misclassification of
pneumonia epizootics could reduce precision, we excluded herd-years for which we were
not reasonably certain were free of pneumonia epizootics. Accuracy and precision of
spatially related covariates would be compromised if biologists were unable to delineate
approximate distributions of herds, so we excluded herds without sufficient spatial data
due to limited herd histories or biologist knowledge.
The statistically rare nature of pneumonia epizootic events makes their prediction
challenging. Pneumonia epizootics occurred in 22 out of 637 (3.45%) of the herd-years
we analyzed. A statistical model based on such data has the potential to incorrectly
predict epizootics (i.e., false positives) more often than correctly. Our use of decision
curve analysis helped evaluate the extent to which managers can rely on our risk model to
make accurate predictions, given the number of pneumonia epizootic events we observed.
This relatively new analysis determines the net benefits of using a predictive model for
making decisions (i.e., its usefulness; Vickers and Elkin 2006, Steyerberg et al. 2010).
This assessment first allowed us to conclude that our top model was more useful than our
second model. It also allowed us to evaluate whether using our model to make a decision
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was more useful than using no model at all. If no model such as ours existed, the status
quo decision would generally be reactive management (i.e., treat all herds as low risk)
because herds cannot be distinguished by risk level and proactive management of all
herds would almost certainly be too costly. To be useful, our predictive model should
provide more correct classifications than either alternative in absence of the model.
Decision curve analysis showed that our model is expected to be more useful than
the status quo. For example, at a threshold probability of 0.028, our model is expected to
provide a net increase in true positive detections of 2.390 per 100 herd-years compared to
total reactive management. It would also provide a net reduction in false positive
detections of 59.632 per 100 herd-years compared to total proactive management,
meaning our model would reduce false positive predictions by 60% over completely
proactive management. Thus, many more correct classifications will be provided by our
model compared to fully reactive management or fully proactive management of all
herds. This ability to reliably differentiate herds by risk level will assist managers in
making decisions on where to direct appropriate, potentially costly proactive actions.
An important advantage of DCA is that tolerance for false positive versus false
negative predictions can be accounted for by selecting different threshold probabilities.
Individual managers will have different risk tolerances when making decisions. Some
managers will be more risk averse given the severe implications of pneumonia epizootics.
More risk-averse managers could select a lower threshold probability to separate high
from low risk herds. Other managers may be more risk tolerant if management actions
would be too costly, in which case they could then select a higher threshold probability.
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MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS
Our model can be used to estimate risk (Table 2.5), compare and prioritize herds for
proactive management, and simulate how potential alternative actions may reduce risk.
The model is not only useful for predicting risk for existing herds, but for estimating
future risk for new transplant herds as well. Our approach and results are unique because
of the extensive spatial and temporal scales used to develop the risk model and make it
valuable for herd-specific decisions as part of regional or statewide management of
bighorn sheep in Montana. Used to inform decisions in a structured decision making
framework (Mitchell et al. 2013), the model can be used to estimate herd-specific
recommendations that best meet agency objectives given each herd’s predicted risk.
Importantly, sophisticated software is not required; a simple spreadsheet can be used to
calculate risk using the parameter estimates from the risk model (Table 2.2). A
spreadsheet for a decision model similar to that shown in Mitchell et al. (2013) would
help managers use the risk model to inform decisions. Use of both models will lead to a
unified, transparent, and consistent approach to making proactive management decisions
given the regional or statewide scale, while simultaneously remaining highly specific to
each herd’s estimated risk and each manager’s goals.
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Figure Captions
Figure 2.1. Locations of 43 herds of bighorn sheep with 22 pneumonia epizootic events
with ≥25% mortality between 1979 and 2013, which we used to develop a pneumonia
risk model for Montana. We excluded several additional epizootics from our analysis.
Numbers correspond to risk estimates in Table 2.5 and to the table for epizootics within
the map, where a * after the herd name indicates that we excluded post-epizootic herdyears from analysis because the herd received transplants, confounding signs of recovery.

Figure 2.2. Sensitivity (dashed lines) and specificity (solid lines) at various threshold
probabilities (pt ’s) for 2 pneumonia risk models developed using data from 1979–2013
for bighorn sheep in Montana. The top-ranked model (black lines) had a higher
sensitivity and specificity than the second-ranked model (gray lines): at pt = 0.0312
sensitivity and specificity were simultaneously maximized with 81.8% sensitivity and
80.2% specificity compared to the second-ranked model which had the same sensitivity
and 75.3% specificity at pt = 0.0288.

Figure 2.3. Decision curves for 2 final a priori models considered for selection as a
pneumonia risk model for bighorn sheep in Montana. The most supported model (black
line) outperformed the second-best model (gray line) over much of the threshold
probability range based on the higher net benefit overall. We selected the most supported
model for the risk model. Using the risk model would be superior to treating all herds as
high risk (dotted line; i.e., indiscriminate proactive management of all herds) at any
threshold probability (pt ) of approximately ≥0.001, and better than treating no herds as
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high risk (dashed line at net benefit = 0; i.e., reactive management of all herds) at any
pt approximately ≤0.389.
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Figure 2.1.

#
12
13
14
15
16
19
19
20
21
22
23

Herd
Bonner
Lower Rock Creek
Upper Rock Creek
Skalkaho
East Fork Bitterroot
Lost Creek
Lost Creek
Highland*
Tendoy Mountains*
North Fork Birch Creek-Teton*
Deep Creek*

Yeara Mortalityb
2010 >65%
2010 >50%
2010 >60%
2012 >70%
2010 >50%
1992 >50%
2011 >60%
1995 >85%
1994 >80%
1984 >25%
1984 >25%

(continued)
24 Gibson Lake North
24 Gibson Lake North
25 Castle Reef
25 Castle Reef
26 Ford Creek
26 Ford Creek
27 Beartooth-Sleeping Giant*
28 Elkhorn
30 Hilgards
31 Hyalite
X Lower Boulder River

a

1984
2010
1984
2010
1984
2010
1984
2008
1997
2013
2000

>25%
>55%
>25%
>55%
>25%
>40%
>60%
>90%
>50%
>35%
100%

Herd-year of die-off, with herd-year starting 1 July the previous year through 30 June of year shown.

b

Approximate total mortality from pneumonia epizootic event.
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Threshold probability, pt, ≤
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Threshold probability, pt
0.4

0.38

0.36

0.34

0.32

0.3

0.28

0.26

0.24

0.22

0.2

0.18

0.16

0.14

0.12

0.1

0.08

0.06

0.04

0.02

0

Net benefit

Figure 2.3.
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Table 2.1. Data types and associated agencies we collected covariate data from to model
risk of pneumonia epizootics for 43 herds of bighorn sheep in Montana from 1979–2013.
Numbers represent the approximate percentage of data associated with each agency out
of all herd-years with data for that covariate, unless otherwise indicated. Where
applicable, we included additional herds beyond our 43 primary herds if they were within
14.5 km of our primary herds or were 1 of the 3 closest herds. Agencies were Montana
Fish, Wildlife and Parks (MFWP), United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS),
Bureau of Land Management (BLM), United States Forest Service (USFS), National
Park Service (NPS), Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT), Chippewa Cree
Tribe (CCT), British Columbia Fish and Wildlife Branch (BCFW), Idaho Fish and Game
(IDFG), and Wyoming Game and Fish (WGFD). Blank cells indicate data were not
associated with these agencies.
Data

MFWP USFWS BLM USFS

Allotmentsa

0b

Private land

68

NPS

CSKT CCT BCFW IDFG WGFD

32

100

Weed control

94

5

Neighbor riskc

75

2

5

4

Herd proximityd

72

2

5

3

Ram:ewe ratios

93

6

1

Density

94

5

1

Herd origin

94

5

1

a

1

2

4

5

5

5

7

5

Of unique allotments ≤14.5 km of herd distributions (n = 47), % associated with each agency.

(continued)
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(continued)
b

No allotments on USFWS land were ≤14.5 km of herd distributions.

c

Of all herds ≤14.5 km from 43 primary herds (n = 56, including 13 non-primary herds), %

associated with each agency.
d

Of all herds that were 1 of 3 closest to 43 primary herds (n = 61, including 18 non-primary herds),

% associated with each agency. Sum >100 is due to rounding.
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Table 2.2. Parameter estimates of supported a priori models of risk of pneumonia
epizootics for 43 herds of bighorn sheep in Montana from 1979–2013. We do not present
models with change in Deviance Information Criterion (∆DIC) >10. Within the
distribution of each herd plus a 14.5-km buffer from that perimeter, private land =
percentage of private land, weed control = whether the herd biologist knew of the use of
domestic sheep or goats for weed control, and neighbor risk = whether the herd or a
neighboring herd had a pneumonia epizootic previously. Density = the number of
individuals counted divided by the area of each herd’s distribution, assigned into 1 of 3
equally sized bins of low, medium (md), and high (hi) density relative to the herd’s
1979–2013 percentage of average. Herd effect is the among-herd variation for the herdlevel random effect.
Credibility interval
Mean

SD
0.025

0.975

Best model
β0 Intercept

−6.269

0.761

−7.931

−4.911

β1 Private land

0.433

0.239

−0.028

0.910

β2 Weed control

1.210

0.547

0.115

2.261

β3 Neighbor risk

2.331

0.524

1.332

3.392

β4 Density(md)

1.660

0.728

0.309

3.180

β5 Density(hi)

2.699

0.742

1.332

4.259

Herd effect

0.242

0.131

0.143

0.609

153.624 4.125

146.679

162.973

Deviance

(continued)
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(continued)
Credibility interval
Mean

SD
0.025

0.975

Second model (∆DIC = 6.9)
β0 Intercept

−5.705

0.709

−7.246

−4.445

β1 Neighbor risk

2.184

0.488

1.244

3.164

β2 Density(md)

1.535

0.731

0.200

3.085

β3 Density(hi)

2.548

0.731

1.206

4.090

Herd effect

0.249

0.147

0.143

0.666

161.519 3.874

154.019

169.736

Deviance
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Table 2.3. Comparison of net benefits and advantages for our pneumonia risk model for
43 herds of bighorn sheep in Montana from 1979–2013. Risk of a pneumonia epizootic is
classified as high if it exceeds a pre-defined threshold probability (pt ), and low otherwise.
The net benefit at each threshold estimates the advantage of the model and can aid
selection in pt for more conservative or liberal estimation based on tolerance of false
positives versus false negatives.
Net benefit

Advantage of model
Increase

Decrease

in TPb

in FPc

0.035

3.454

0.000

0.032

0.031

3.183

29.199

0.411

0.028

0.027

2.838

20.251

0.955

0.551

0.028

0.023

2.770

40.293

0.016

0.909

0.657

0.026

0.019

2.601

44.113

0.020

0.864

0.711

0.024

0.015

2.412

45.526

0.024

0.864

0.748

0.024

0.011

2.384

53.061

0.028

0.864

0.787

0.024

0.007

2.390

59.632

0.032

0.773

0.807

0.021

0.003

2.051

54.121

0.036

0.773

0.837

0.021

−0.002

2.083

59.829

0.040

0.773

0.847

0.021

−0.006

2.054

62.951

0.050

0.727

0.876

0.019

−0.016

1.884

66.719

0.060

0.545

0.907

0.013

−0.027

1.313

63.004

pt , ≤

Sensitivity

0.000

1.000

0.000

0.035

0.004

1.000

0.302

0.008

0.955

0.012

Specificity

Risk model

(continued)
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Treat alla

(continued)
Net benefit

Advantage of model
Increase

Decrease

in TPb

in FPc

−0.038

1.258

67.369

0.012

−0.049

1.160

70.173

0.932

0.011

−0.061

1.075

72.493

0.364

0.932

0.005

−0.073

0.523

70.173

0.200

0.273

0.977

0.004

−0.207

0.392

84.301

0.300

0.136

0.992

0.001

−0.379

0.135

88.802

pt , ≤

Sensitivity

0.070

0.545

0.914

0.013

0.080

0.545

0.914

0.090

0.500

0.100

a

Specificity

Risk model

Treat alla

Net benefits for treat all herds as high risk, a management alternative in absence of using

our risk model to predict and separate high from low risk herds.
b

Increase in true positives per 100 estimates without increase in false positives compared

to treating all herds as low risk.
c

Reduction in false positives per 100 estimates without increase in false negatives

compared to treating all herds as high risk.
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Table 2.4. Parameter estimates of the second generation model for risk of pneumonia
epizootics for 43 herds of bighorn sheep in Montana from 1979–2013. The Deviance
Information Criterion (DIC) of our second generation model was 4 lower than that of our
top-ranked a priori model. Within the distribution of each herd plus a 14.5-km buffer
from that perimeter, private land = percentage of private land, weed control = whether the
herd biologist knew of the use of domestic sheep or goats for weed control, and neighbor
risk = whether the herd or a neighboring herd had a pneumonia epizootic previously.
Density = the number of individuals counted divided by the area of each herd’s
distribution, assigned into 1 of 3 equally sized bins of low, medium (md), and high (hi)
density relative to the herd’s 1979–2013 percentage of average. Spring = the percentage
of average 1 April‒30 June precipitation in the herd distribution compared to the average
from 1980‒2010. Herd effect is the among-herd variation for the herd-level random
effect.
Credibility interval
Mean

SD
0.025

0.975

Second generation model
β0 Intercept

−6.856

0.935

−8.925

−5.288

β1 Private land

0.487

0.256

−0.002

1.005

β2 Weed control

1.300

0.577

0.144

2.409

β3 Neighbor risk

2.474

0.549

1.426

3.583

β4 Density(md)

1.876

0.809

0.447

3.633

β5 Density(hi)

3.066

0.843

1.577

4.884

(continued)
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(continued)
Credibility interval
Mean

β6 Spring
Herd effect
Deviance

SD
0.025

0.975

−0.882

0.342

−1.587

−0.244

0.250

0.149

0.143

0.676

147.583 4.593

139.739

157.825
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Table 2.5. Estimates for risk of pneumonia epizootics as of 2012 for 42 herds of bighorn
sheep in Montana, calculated with the pneumonia risk model we developed. The 10-year
risk is the probability of ≥1 pneumonia epizootic occurring in 10 years if levels of risk
factors remain unchanged. Map ID # corresponds to Figure 2.1. Within the distribution of
each herd plus a 14.5-km buffer from that perimeter, private land = percentage of private
land, weed control = whether the herd biologist knew of the use of domestic sheep or
goats for weed control, and neighbor risk = whether the herd or a neighboring herd had a
pneumonia epizootic previously. Density = the number of individuals counted divided by
the area of each herd’s distribution, assigned into 1 of 3 equally sized bins of low,
medium, and high density relative to the herd’s 1979–2013 percentage of average. Where
density estimates were unavailable for 2012, we used the most recent density before that
year.
Risk factors:
Private
Map

Pr(Epizootic):

Neig-

10 yr

Weed
Herd name

land

ID #

1 yr
hbor

Density

control
(%)

(beginning
(2012)

risk

2012)

1

Ten Lakes

21.25

No

Yes

High

0.203

0.897

2

Koocanusa

6.08

No

No

Low

0.001

0.011

3

Kootenai Falls

25.75

No

No

Low

0.002

0.019

4

Berray Mountain

15.06

No

No

Low

0.001

0.014

5

Thompson Falls

34.96

No

No

Low

0.002

0.025

6

Cut-off

30.04

No

No

High

0.031

0.271

(continued)
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(continued)
Risk factors:
Private
Map

Pr(Epizootic):

Neig-

10 yr

Weed
Herd name

land

ID #

1 yr
hbor

Density

control
(%)

(beginning
(2012)

risk

2012)

7

Perma-Paradise

32.20

No

No

Medium

0.012

0.114

8

Hog Heaven

57.43

No

No

Low

0.005

0.048

9

Wildhorse Island

39.32

No

No

High

0.041

0.340

10

Bison Range

47.81

No

No

High

0.052

0.412

11

Petty Creek

36.79

No

No

High

0.038

0.320

12

Bonner

46.27

Yes

Yes

Low

0.108

0.681

13

Lower Rock Creek

39.75

Yes

Yes

Low

0.091

0.613

14

Upper Rock Creek

29.33

No

Yes

Low

0.021

0.194

15

Skalkahoa

34.29

Yes

No

High

0.109

0.685

16

East Fork Bitterroot

10.60

Yes

Yes

Low

0.040

0.336

17

Painted Rocks

6.03

Yes

Yes

Medium

0.161

0.827

18

Garrison

54.37

Yes

Yes

Low

0.134

0.761

19

Lost Creek

35.73

Yes

Yes

Low

0.081

0.571

20

Highland

35.14

No

Yes

Low

0.025

0.226

21

Tendoy Mountains

26.14

No

Yes

Low

0.019

0.178

22

North Fork Birch Creek-Teton

27.24

No

Yes

Low

0.020

0.183

23

Deep Creek

26.66

No

Yes

Low

0.020

0.181

24

Gibson Lake North

6.04

No

Yes

Low

0.011

0.103

25

Castle Reef

34.46

No

Yes

Medium

0.118

0.714

(continued)
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(continued)
Risk factors:
Private
Map

Pr(Epizootic):

Neig-

10 yr

Weed
Herd name

land

ID #

1 yr
hbor

Density

control
(%)

(beginning
(2012)

risk

2012)

26

Ford Creek

21.81

No

Yes

Medium

0.084

0.584

27

Beartooth-Sleeping Giant

74.67

Yes

Yes

Low

0.220

0.917

28

Elkhorn

51.41

No

Yes

Low

0.040

0.338

29

Spanish Peaks

28.83

No

No

Medium

0.011

0.103

30

Hilgards

14.58

No

Yes

High

0.173

0.850

31

Hyaliteb

26.86

No

No

Low

0.002

0.019

32

Upper Yellowstone

9.26

No

Yes

High

0.151

0.806

33

Mill Creek

17.63

Yes

No

Medium

0.026

0.229

34

Monument Peak

0.31

No

No

High

0.013

0.123

35

East Yellowstone

0.75

No

No

High

0.013

0.125

36

Stillwater

8.53

No

No

High

0.017

0.155

37

West Rosebud

16.28

No

No

High

0.021

0.190

38

Hellroaring

9.27

Yes

No

Low

0.004

0.038

39

Pryor Mountains

14.26

Yes

No

Low

0.005

0.044

40

Missouri River Breaks

44.91

Yes

No

High

0.144

0.788

41

Little Rockies

31.18

No

No

Low

0.002

0.022

42

Middle Missouri Breaks

24.57

No

No

Low

0.002

0.018

a

Had epizootic in 2012 and is now positive for neighbor risk, increasing Pr(Epizootic10-yr ) after 2012.

b

Had epizootic in 2013 and is now positive for neighbor risk, increasing Pr(Epizootic10-yr ) after 2013.
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CHAPTER 3:
MODELING PROACTIVE DECISIONS TO MANAGE PNEUMONIA
EPIZOOTICS IN BIGHORN SHEEP

ABSTRACT Pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis) are a major
challenge for wildlife agencies due to the complexity of the disease, long-term impacts,
and lack of tools to manage risk. We developed a decision model to facilitate proactive
management of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep in Montana. Our decision model
integrates a risk model to predict probability of pneumonia epizootics based on identified
risk factors. It uses a structured decision making (SDM) approach to analyze potential
decisions based on predictions from the risk model, herd-specific management objectives,
and predicted consequences and trade-offs. We demonstrated our model’s use with an
analysis of representative herds and analyzed the recommended decisions to understand
them clearly. We learned that proactive management for each herd was expected to
outperform in meeting multiple, competing management objectives compared to ongoing
status quo management. Based on sensitivity analyses, we also learned that the
recommended decisions were relatively robust with limited sensitivity to variations in
model inputs and uncertainties; we expect this to be the case in future analyses as well.
Our decision model addressed the challenges of uncertainty, risk tolerance, and the multiobjective nature of management of bighorn sheep while providing a consistent,
transparent, and deliberative approach for making decisions for each herd. It is a unique
tool for managing pneumonia epizootics using an accessible framework for biologists and
managers. Our work also provides a case study for developing similar SDM-based
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decision models, particularly for other wildlife diseases, to address challenges of making
complex decisions.
INTRODUCTION
Pneumonia epizootics pose a critical challenge for management of bighorn sheep (Ovis
canadensis; Gross et al. 2000, Cahn et al. 2011, Wehausen et al. 2011, Cassirer et al.
2013, Plowright et al. 2013). All-age epizootic events result in high initial mortality that
can exceed 80% (Enk et al. 2001, Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks [MFWP] 2010, Sells
et al. 2015). Subsequent pneumonia outbreaks may continue for decades, often resulting
in chronically low lamb recruitment which may ultimately lead to the herd’s extirpation
(Enk et al. 2001, Cassirer and Sinclair 2007, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013,
Sells et al. 2015). This is a particular threat for herds with low pre-epizootic abundance,
high mortality rates during the epizootic, or that experience other random events that
further threaten the herd with extirpation (Woodroffe 1999, Singer et al. 2000, Cassirer
and Sinclair 2007, Cassirer et al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013). In Montana there have
been at least 22 epizootics of ≥25% mortality from 1979‒2013, 15 of which resulted in
>50% mortality (MFWP 2010, Sells et al. 2015); 11 epizootics have occurred since 2008
alone. Impacts of epizootics have included total extirpation of 1 herd and poor recovery
in at least 3 others, despite up to 30 years of recovery efforts by Montana Fish, Wildlife
and Parks (MFWP).
A lack of tools to predict and proactively manage risk of pneumonia epizootics
often leads to reactive “crisis management” following epizootic events (Woodroffe 1999,
Mitchell et al. 2013, Sells et al. 2015). Intensive, costly management may be required to
help herds recover, including culling (Edwards et al. 2010), augmentation (MFWP 2010),
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and reintroductions (Singer et al. 2000), although herds may never entirely recover to
their former abundance and state of health (e.g., Enk et al. 2001, MFWP 2010, Cassirer et
al. 2013, Plowright et al. 2013, Sells et al. 2015).
Proactive management to prevent pneumonia epizootics requires tools to predict
risk and to develop and evaluate potential proactive decisions to reduce that risk. Sells et
al. (2015) developed an empirical model for predicting risk of pneumonia epizootics in
Montana. The model is expected to reduce false positive and negative binary predictions
of risk and therefore be reliable and useful for making decisions (Sells et al. 2015).
Estimating risk accurately does not, however, automatically imply appropriate proactive
management. Given multiple approaches and objectives for proactively managing
pneumonia epizootics, a decision model is needed to evaluate the consequences and
trade-offs of alternative approaches. Incorporating uncertainty in such a model is critical
to making good decisions, particularly for relatively rare, hard-to-predict epizootic
events. We used structured decision making (Gregory et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson
2013, Mitchell et al. 2013) to develop such a decision model for proactive management
of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep in Montana, based on a prototype developed by
Mitchell et al. (2013). Structured decision making (SDM) is a deliberative, transparent,
and defensible method for identifying a management action most likely to achieve
desired outcomes. It provides a consistent approach for making decisions, allows
inclusion of multiple competing objectives, accounts for uncertainty, and can account for
risk tolerance (Gregory et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013). In this paper, we describe
each general step of the SDM-based components of our decision model. We apply our
model to hypothetical management of representative herds of bighorn sheep in Montana,
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and analyze sensitivity of the recommended decision to potential influences that could
affect the outcome of the analysis.
COMPONENTS OF THE DECISION MODEL
An SDM-based decision model breaks a decision down into its logical components: 1)
problem statement, 2) fundamental objectives, 3) alternatives, and 4) decision analysis
(Gregory et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013). The problem statement defines the
decision context, fundamental objectives are the goals, and alternatives are the various
management approaches. Decision analysis involves evaluating risk, consequences, and
trade-offs for alternatives. Mitchell et al. (2013) presented these steps for proactively
managing epizootics from a workshop held with MFWP managers and biologists. In
2014 we met with a working group consisting of different MFWP biologists and
managers to revisit the Mitchell et al. (2013) work and complete the decision model for
pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep. We then designed the decision model in
spreadsheet format to allow easy use by any decision-maker. Generally, the appropriate
decision-maker is the biologist or manager responsible for each herd. Decisions therefore
remain local and community-based within MFWP because the appropriate decisionmakers can easily use the model to evaluate potential decisions specific to their herds,
without the SDM expertise, working groups, or meetings typically relied upon for SDMbased decision analyses.
Problem Statement
We refined the problem statement from Mitchell et al. (2013) to describe the issue of
pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep as follows:
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MFWP has direct experience with bighorn sheep pneumonia epizootic events that
have affected conservation and public enjoyment of bighorn sheep. MFWP currently
has no tools for evaluating whether taking actions to proactively prevent similar
events will produce more desirable results. MFWP wildlife managers and biologists
need risk assessment and decision analysis tools to help prioritize and allocate
resources to identify and manage the risk of major disease events. These tools need
flexibility in their implementation so that decisions about bighorn sheep management
and conservation remain local and community-based. Management actions and tools
should be implemented with a monitoring program in a way that will reduce
uncertainty and risk in the future.
Fundamental Objectives
In SDM, fundamental objectives define what a fully successful solution to the problem
would accomplish (Gregory et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013) and are used to
evaluate potential decisions. Each fundamental objective has an associated measurable
attribute used to quantify the extent to which a fundamental objective is achieved by a
solution to the problem. We refined the fundamental objectives and associated
measurable attributes for pneumonia epizootics presented by Mitchell et al. (2013) as:
1. Maximize the probability of herd persistence (measured as utility in terms of the
probability of avoiding an epizootic).
2. Minimize costs in terms of:
a. operational costs; i.e., cost of day-to-day activities associated with
management of bighorn sheep (measured in dollars),
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b. personnel costs; i.e., cost of day-to-day activities associated with management
activities (measured in days), and
c. crisis response costs, i.e., operating costs and costs of personnel time for
responding to an epizootic (measured in dollars).
3. Maximize public satisfaction in terms of:
a. viewing opportunity (measured as relatively low, medium, or high for the
herd), and
b. hunting opportunity (measured in the predicted number of licenses issued).
Alternatives
Alternatives are the potential management approaches a decision maker could use to
solve the problem (Gregory et al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013). For managing
pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep, we developed alternatives related to risk factors
identified in the Sells et al. (2015) risk model. Through analysis of histories of 43 herds
in Montana from 1979‒2013, Sells et al. (2015) identified 4 risk factors positively
associated with probability of pneumonia epizootics within herds (Table 3.1). These
were:
1. greater amounts of private land in a herd’s area of high risk (herd distribution plus a
14.5-km buffer), expected to represent risk from hobby or commercial farms with
domestic sheep or goats (“private land”),
2. when domestic sheep or goats were known to be used to control weeds in the herd’s
area of high risk (“weed control”),
3. when the herd or a neighboring herd in the herd’s area of high risk had a pneumonia
epizootic since 1979 (“neighbor risk”), and
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4. when the within-herd density was medium or high rather than low, based on the herdspecific variation in density from 1979‒2013 (“density”).
We developed the alternatives based on management techniques biologists and managers
thought would successfully reduce risk from these factors, and organized the alternatives
in a matrix based on each risk factor and from generally least to most aggressive
alternatives (Fig. 3.1). Decision-makers can combine these and other alternatives they
create to evaluate unique portfolios of management actions for their specific herds in the
decision model. Each portfolio is an alternative management approach the decisionmaker wants to analyze for their herd. Current management actions are detailed in a
“status quo” portfolio for comparison. During the decision analysis, the status quo and
each new portfolio are analyzed to identify which has most support for implementation.
Representative Herds for Analysis.—We selected 3 herds representative of
challenges of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep for which decision-makers (the
MFWP biologist responsible for each herd) designed portfolios and tested with our
decision model (Fig. 3.2). The Petty Creek herd was a moderate-risk herd of >125
individuals as of 2014. Given recent epizootics nearby, the decision-maker for Petty
Creek was very risk averse towards pneumonia epizootics for this herd.
In contrast, the nearby high-risk Bonner herd experienced one such epizootic in
2010. The decision-maker for Bonner was very risk tolerant toward pneumonia epizootics
given the recent epizootic, counts of only 11 animals in 2014, and a situation that seemed
unlikely to improve in the near future without extensive, costly management.
The low-risk Perma-Paradise herd was managed by the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes on the Perma side of the herd distribution and by MFWP on the Paradise
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side. The herd was popular with the hunting public, with the third highest number of
applicants for licenses within a single MFWP hunting district in Montana. Due to a
robust size of >250 individuals and the herd’s popularity, the decision-maker for the
Paradise portion of the herd was very risk averse toward pneumonia epizootics in this
herd.
Portfolios for Representative Herds.—Decision-makers described the status quo
portfolio for their herds and then developed unique portfolios for comparison. Portfolios
were herd-specific, based on the risk factors affecting the herd and what actions the
decision-maker thought would reduce that risk. Portfolios for Petty Creek included the:
1. Status Quo Portfolio (including public education about risk from domestic sheep and
goats, surveys and inventories, harvest management, and responding to wandering
domestic sheep and goats),
2. Transplant Removal Portfolio (focused on removing bighorn sheep through a
transplant operation, plus public education about risk from domestic sheep and goats
on private land, surveys and inventories, harvest management, and both removal and
hazing of wandering domestic and bighorn sheep),
3. Lethal Removal Portfolio (focused on lethal removal zones around the herd, plus
public education about risk from domestic sheep and goats on private land, surveys
and inventories, harvest management, and removal of wandering domestic and
bighorn sheep), and
4. Easement Portfolio (focused on conservation easements and fee title purchases to
reduce risk from farms with domestic sheep and goats, plus improvement of range
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health, public education about risk from domestic sheep and goats on private land,
surveys and inventories, and harvest management).
The decision-maker for Bonner designed portfolios to build off the status quo and
one-another. Portfolios included the:
1. Status Quo Portfolio (including surveys and inventories, post-epizootic monitoring,
necropsies, public education about risk from domestic sheep and goats, removal of
wandering domestic or bighorn sheep if found comingling, and using fencing and
herders for weed control operations),
2. Outreach Phase 1 Portfolio (all status quo actions plus increased outreach, with focus
on more public education and working with the city of Missoula to end weed control
with domestic sheep),
3. Outreach Phase 1+2 Portfolio (including all Outreach Phase 1 actions plus additional
public education and outreach to amend the herd’s management plan regarding
contact between domestic and bighorn sheep), and
4. Ideal Portfolio (including all Outreach Phase 1 + 2 actions plus an augmentation to
increase herd size).
Risk factors for Perma-Paradise were related to private land and density, so the
decision-maker focused on alternatives addressing these risk factors and designed
portfolios based on the relative level of aggression of alternatives (Fig. 3.1). Portfolios
included the:
1. Status Quo Portfolio (including surveys and inventories and harvest management),
2. Least Aggressive Portfolio (including the least aggressive actions such as increased
public education about risk from domestic sheep and goats on private land),
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3. Moderately Aggressive Portfolio (including least and moderately aggressive actions
such as conservation easements and fee title purchases, removal of wandering bighorn
sheep, and increased harvest), and
4. Most Aggressive Portfolio (including least, moderate, and most aggressive actions
designed to reduce risk from private land and density).
Decision Analysis
Decision analysis in SDM includes predicting risk, estimating consequences, and
evaluating trade-offs for each portfolio (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986, Edwards and
Barron 1994, Gregory et al. 2012, Mitchell et al. 2013). These steps comprise the analysis
of the potential decisions by incorporating uncertainty, expected consequences of
epizootics, and relative importance of fundamental objectives to quantify support for each
portfolio.
Predicting Risk.—The first step of a decision analysis is for the decision-maker to
predict, for each portfolio, the probability of potential outcomes that may occur once a
decision is made. For pneumonia epizootics, the 2 potential outcomes are that an
epizootic either does or does not occur. Predictions can be made using expert opinion
(e.g., Mitchell et al. 2013) or an empirical risk model (e.g., Sells et al. 2015). These
predictions incorporate uncertainty into the decision analysis, for the timing and location
of a pneumonia epizootic can never be known with certainty in advance (Gregory et al.
2012, Mitchell et al. 2013).
Our decision model used the risk model of Sells et al. (2015) to help decisionmakers predict risk for each portfolio in a risk prediction table (Table 3.2). The risk
model yielded 1-year probability of a pneumonia epizootic, from which long-term risk
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could be calculated for use in the decision analysis (Sells et al. 2015). To begin, the
decision-maker entered data associated with each risk factor, R, for the status quo, then
estimated hypothetical risk for each portfolio by predicting how the portfolio would
affect R. Whereas Sells et al. (2015) designed most risk factors as categorical, we treated
all R as continuous with a 0‒1 range because we expected few actions could realistically
eliminate a risk factor entirely, i.e., completely reduce a categorical R from “1” (full
effect) to “0” (no effect). Instead, the decision-maker estimated relative reductions in
risk, e.g., if they thought public education about weed control with domestic sheep and
goats would reduce that risk by 30%, they entered “0.7” for that R.
Once the decision-maker entered data for all R, logit risk was calculated with the
parameter values (β) from the Sells et al. (2015) risk model:
Logit risk = βintercept + βprivate land × Rprivate land + βweed control × Rweed control +
βneighbor risk × Rneighbor risk + βdensity(md) × Rdensity(md) + βdensity(hi) × Rdensity(hi)
and transformed to the probability of pneumonia epizootic (i.e., risk) in any 1 year by:
Pr(Epizootic1-yr ) = (eLogit risk )⁄(1 + eLogit risk )
(Ramsey and Schafer 1997). Long-term risk of ≥1 epizootic occurring in the next y years
was:
Pr(Epizooticlong-term ) = 1 − [1 − Pr(Epizootic1-yr )]y
(Mood et al. 1974). Finally, probability of no epizootic in that long-term timeframe was:
Pr(No epizooticlong-term ) = 1 − Pr(Epizooticlong-term )
(De Veaux et al. 2012). These long-term predictions were used in the remaining decision
analysis steps. Long-term predictions assumed R inputs remain unchanged for y years;
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decision-makers could analyze shorter timeframes for y depending on how long they
expected R would remain unchanged.
Estimating Consequences.—The second step of a decision analysis is predicting
how each potential outcome (e.g., epizootic and no epizootic) will affect the fundamental
objectives. (E.g., if an epizootic occurred, what would be the predicted costs of crisis
response?) Decision-makers predicted consequences of an epizootic and no epizootic for
each fundamental objective and each portfolio in a consequence table (Table 3.3).
Consequence tables were structured by objectives and portfolios to enable organization,
comparison, and analysis of the predicted consequences (Gregory et al. 2012, Mitchell et
al. 2013).
Once the decision-maker entered each predicted consequence, the consequence
table translated them into expected values for the decision analysis. The expected value
(EV) of a consequence was the sum of consequences for the potential outcomes weighted
by their probabilities:
EV= Consequence Epizootic × Pr(Epizooticlong-term ) +
Consequence No epizootic × Pr(No epizooticlong-term )
(Gregory et al. 2012). The EV was thus the combined expected consequences, accounting
for uncertainty. An exception to this calculation for EV is if risk attitude is important to
an analysis of consequences. In our decision analysis, risk attitude toward herd
persistence was important because different decision-makers had various degrees of risk
tolerance or aversion toward probability of an epizootic. To factor risk attitude into the
EV for persistence, decision-makers selected a risk attitude curve (Fig. 3.3; Conroy and
Peterson 2013). We designed the curves as:
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Utility[Pr(No epizooticlong-term )] = 1 − Pr(Epizooticlong-term )r
where r was the risk tolerance factor (0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, or 4, corresponding to very risk
averse, risk averse, risk neutral, risk tolerant, or very risk tolerant, accordingly). The EV
for persistence for each portfolio, Utility[Pr(No epizooticlong-term )], accounted for the
decision-maker’s attitude toward Pr(Epizooticlong-term ) of each portfolio.
Next, the consequence table translated EV to normalized values, X’. Normalizing
put EV of each objective on a 0‒1 scale to make EV of all objectives directly
comparable. If the goal of an objective was to maximize it,
X’ = (x − xmin )⁄(xmax − xmin ),
and if to minimize,
X’ = (x − xmax )⁄(xmin − xmax ),
where x were the original EV within an objective (Gregory et al. 2012).
Evaluating Trade-offs.—Evaluation of trade-offs is the final step of a decision
analysis. One type of trade-off is the relative importance of each objective, since rarely
can any single portfolio perform best on all objectives. Swing weights, wi , were the
importance the decision-maker placed on each objective, calculated through swing
weighting (Table 3.3; von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986, Edwards and Barron 1994,
Gregory et al. 2012). Swing weighting accounted for the predicted difference in EV from
worst- to best-case scenario for each objective. This swing was important because if there
was little difference from worst- to best-case predictions for an objective (i.e., all
predictions for an objective were about equal), it need not have influenced the decision.
Resulting wi summed to 1.0.
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Support for each portfolio was determined through weighted scores and overall
scores. Weighted scores described each portfolio’s performance within single objectives,
whereas overall scores described each portfolio’s performance over all objectives.
Weighted scores were based on the normalized values and corresponding weight for that
objective, calculated as X’ × wi (Table 3.3; von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986, Edwards
and Barron 1994, Gregory et al. 2012, Mitchell et al. 2013). Portfolios with higher
weighted scores were predicted to perform better for that objective compared to
portfolios with lower weighted scores. The sum of weighted scores of a portfolio was its
overall score for all objectives. Portfolios with higher overall scores had more decision
support based on the predicted risk, predicted consequences, and weighted importance of
each objective.
To make a decision, the decision-maker compared overall scores and considered
trade-offs between weighted scores. Trade-offs occur in SDM when no single portfolio
has the highest weighted scores on all fundamental objectives. In some cases, a portfolio
was the clear choice if no other portfolios scored closely and a lower-scored portfolio’s
benefits did not outweigh its negative trade-offs. When ≥2 portfolios performed similarly
well in overall scores, trade-offs were an important consideration before identifying a
final portfolio for implementation (Gregory et al. 2012). Portfolios with slightly lower
overall scores could have provided a better compromise in meeting multiple objectives
reasonably well, particularly if the highest-scored portfolio did poorly on certain
objectives.
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RESULTS OF THE DECISION ANALYSES
Using our decision model, decision-makers completed analyses for Petty Creek, Bonner,
and Perma-Paradise. We analyzed whether our model was able to help identify decisions
for each representative herd. We then analyzed sensitivity of these decisions to various
model components.
Model Ability to Identify Decisions
For Petty Creek, the decision-maker chose to analyze a timeframe of 5 years; 5-year
Pr(Epizooticlong-term ) ranged from a low of 0.038 for the Transplant Removal Portfolio to
0.264 for the Status Quo (Table 3.2). The decision analysis resulted in high overall scores
for 2 portfolios; either would be a good decision with slight trade-offs between each. The
Transplant Removal Portfolio had greatest support with 0.74 overall score (Table 3.3;
Fig. 3.4). It had the highest weighted scores for persistence, crisis response costs, and
viewing opportunity, with trade-off of worst hunting opportunity and second-worst
personnel costs. The Lethal Removal Portfolio scored nearly as highly at 0.71 overall
score. Its trade-offs included lower weighted scores for objectives scoring highest in the
Transplant Removal Portfolio, but slightly better weighted scores for personnel costs and
hunting opportunity.
For Bonner and Perma-Paradise, decision-makers chose 10-year timeframes to
implement a portfolio longer before re-analyzing each herd. Results supported 1 clear
decision for each herd. For Bonner, 10-year Pr(Epizooticlong-term ) ranged from 0.173 for
the Ideal Portfolio to 0.719 for the Status Quo. The Ideal Portfolio had most support (0.61
overall score; Fig. 3.4), with highest weighted scores on all objectives except operating
and personnel costs. Low overall scores of 0.39‒0.44 for remaining portfolios were not
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comparable. For Perma-Paradise, 10-year Pr(Epizooticlong-term ) ranged from 0.058 for the
Most Aggressive Portfolio to 0.114 for the Status Quo. The Most Aggressive Portfolio
had the highest overall score (0.80), with highest weighted scores for persistence,
viewing opportunity, and hunting opportunity. Remaining portfolios with scores of 0.15‒
0.60 were not comparable.
Sensitivity Analyses
We evaluated performance of our model and analyzed sensitivity of results to uncertainty
in risk predictions, risk attitude, and weights (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986, Conroy
and Peterson 2013).
Sensitivity to Uncertainty.—The credibility intervals (CRIs; Kéry 2010) quantified
uncertainty of Pr(Epizooticlong-term ) in the risk prediction table (Table 3.2). We replaced
Pr(Epizooticlong-term ) in the consequence table (Table 3.3) with lower (10%) or upper
(90%) CRIs in turn to test sensitivity of overall scores to this source of uncertainty.
The analyses for our representative herds were not sensitive to the uncertainty of
Pr(Epizooticlong-term ) from the risk model. For Petty Creek, overall scores did not change
using lower CRIs. Overall scores for the Lethal Removal Portfolio and Status Quo
decreased slightly using upper CRIs. For Bonner, the Ideal Portfolio remained highest
scored; support for other portfolios barely changed. The same was true for PermaParadise, with the Most Aggressive Portfolio remaining highest scored. Despite
potentially extensive uncertainty in Pr(Epizooticlong-term ), it appears unlikely to affect the
results of the decision analysis.
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Sensitivity to Risk Attitude.—We compared overall scores at each different risk
attitude (Fig. 3.3) to test the sensitivity of the recommended decisions for each herd to
this subjective model component. Although overall scores between the highest-scored
portfolios for Petty Creek slightly fluctuated at different risk attitudes, they remained
almost identical. The original highest-scored portfolios retained the highest score at any
risk attitude for both Bonner and Perma-Paradise; other portfolios were never
comparable. The recommended decisions for the representative herds thus had minimal
sensitivity to risk attitude.
Sensitivity to Weights.—We also tested sensitivity of the recommended decisions
for each herd to weights on objectives (wi ). To do so, we varied wi from 0‒1 for an
objective while holding remaining wi at their original values to identify values for
“switchover,” the wi at which the recommended portfolio changed (von Winterfeldt and
Edwards 1986).
For Petty Creek, the Transplant Removal and Lethal Removal portfolios nearly
always retained the highest overall scores regardless of wi (Fig. 3.5). Switchover to the
Lethal Removal Portfolio occurred for wpersistence ≤0.10 or wpersonnel costs ≥0.34.
Switchover to this portfolio also occurred at whunting opportunity ≥0.34 and to the Easement
Portfolio at ≥0.53. Results were not sensitive to remaining wi . Altogether, overall scores
between these portfolios remained close, meaning changes in wi would not result in a
clearly superior decision.
Bonner and Perma-Paradise were insensitive to wi . For Bonner, switchover from
Ideal to Status Quo occurred in the unlikely scenarios of wpersistence ≤0.07, woperating costs
≥0.41, or wpersonnel costs ≥0.43. For Perma-Paradise, switchover to Moderately Aggressive
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occurred in the unlikely scenario of wpersonnel cost ≥0.55, and to Least Aggressive if
woperating cost ≥0.58 or wpersonnel cost ≥0.72. The recommended decisions for the
representative herds therefore had minimal sensitivity to wi .
DISCUSSION
We created a decision model to facilitate proactive decisions for managing risk of
pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep. We found that proactive decisions were
recommended over the status quo management for each representative herd we analyzed.
The portfolios that scored highest for each herd were predicted to meet fundamental
objectives better than any other portfolios decision-makers developed and analyzed for
their herds. We were not surprised that the generally more aggressive types of portfolios
performed well for Petty Creek and Perma-Paradise given the decision-makers’ risk
aversion towards pneumonia epizootics. We were uncertain what to expect from the
analysis for Bonner due to the herd’s recent epizootic event and the decision-maker’s
higher risk tolerance towards pneumonia epizootics as a result, yet the more aggressive
portfolio was also recommended. If this portfolio were excluded from the analysis, (e.g.,
if it was deemed too expensive), however, remaining portfolios would have
approximately equal support. The decision may then be the Status Quo; we expected this
would be true in a herd with few ways to improve consequences for most objectives after
a recent epizootic.
One of the greatest challenges for good decision-making is addressing
uncertainty. For pneumonia epizootics, there is extensive uncertainty about timing and
location of relatively rare epizootic events. We factored this uncertainty into the decision
model with the Sells et al. (2015) risk model so that probability of pneumonia epizootic
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was used throughout the decision analysis. Sells et al. (2015) used decision curve analysis
to analyze the reliability of their model for making decisions by exploring the balance
between false positives and negatives at various thresholds for binary risk level (Vickers
and Elkin 2006, Steyerberg et al. 2010, Sells et al. 2015). They found that the risk model
is expected to be reliable for making decisions, leading us to be confident in its use in our
decision model. The decision analysis may still be sensitive to a decision-maker’s
estimates for effects of portfolios on risk (e.g., R inputs in Table 3.2), yet changes to
these estimates are unlikely to influence the analysis unless overall rank or magnitude of
estimated risk across portfolios change (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986).
Our sensitivity analyses of results for the representative herds revealed that the
recommended decisions were not sensitive to uncertainty for risk predictions, risk
attitude, and weights. The final decision is important rather than the exact values within a
decision model, and changes to inputs often have limited effect on the decision unless
changes are large (von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986). Based on results from our
representative herds, we expect the decision analyses from our model to generally be
insensitive to any of these components, with only slight variations in overall scores when
an analysis has >1 highly scored portfolio. When this is the case, trade-offs between
multiple highly scored portfolios are the important consideration rather than the overall
scores alone.
Our decision model is a unique tool that accounts for the important, inherent
uncertainty surrounding timing and location of pneumonia epizootic events while
simultaneously making explicit the many considerations needed to make good proactive
decisions. It also exemplifies the role of SDM-based decision models for managing
83

wildlife, particularly for managing disease. An adaptive management approach will
improve the model through learning from implementation of each decision (Gregory et
al. 2012, Conroy and Peterson 2013). A monitoring program on the efficacy of proactive
actions and occurrence of future epizootics would provide data to continuously refine the
model and future decisions, yielding increasingly effective proactive management of
pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep.
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Figure Captions
Figure 3.1. Example management alternatives to address risk factors for pneumonia
epizootics in bighorn sheep. Actions range from least to most aggressive and correspond
to risk factors identified by Sells et al. (2015).

Figure 3.2. Location of several herds of bighorn sheep in western Montana. Decisionmakers evaluated potential proactive management actions for pneumonia epizootics for
Petty Creek, Bonner, and Perma-Paradise with our decision model.

Figure 3.3. Risk attitude curves for probability of pneumonia epizootics in bighorn sheep
for the decision model we developed. After a decision-maker selected a curve for their
tolerance toward risk of pneumonia epizootics, the decision model calculated
corresponding utilities for each portfolio for the fundamental objective of maximizing
persistence in the consequence table (Table 3.3).

Figure 3.4. Overall scores for portfolios (i.e., potential decisions) decision-makers
evaluated to proactively manage risk of pneumonia epizootics in 3 herds of bighorn sheep
in Montana. Scores were calculated using the decision model we developed; higher
overall scores indicated greater support.

Figure 3.5. Sensitivity of decisions recommended by our decision model to weight on
objectives, wi , for managing risk of pneumonia epizootics in the Petty Creek herd of
bighorn sheep in Montana. We varied a wi from 0‒1 while holding other wi at original
88

values. Lines correspond to the various portfolios we evaluated, with higher overall
scores indicating greater support. Where lines cross, the recommended decision changed,
though similar overall scores indicated similar support for either portfolio. Our results
had limited sensitivity to wi .

89

Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.5.
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94
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Table 3.1. Parameter estimates of the risk model (Sells et al. 2015) for pneumonia
epizootics for bighorn sheep. Within the herd distribution plus a 14.5-km buffer from that
perimeter, βprivate land is percentage of private land, βweed control is known use of domestic
sheep or goats for weed control, and βneighbor risk is whether the herd or a neighboring herd
had a pneumonia epizootic previously. βdensity(md) and βdensity(hi) are herd-specific at low,
medium (md), and high (hi) density relative to the herd’s 1979–2013 percentage of
average.
Credibility interval
Parameters

βintercept

Mean

SD
0.025

0.975

-6.269

0.761

-7.931

-4.911

βprivate land

0.433

0.239

-0.028

0.910

βweed control

1.210

0.547

0.115

2.261

βneighbor risk

2.331

0.524

1.332

3.392

βdensity(md)

1.660

0.728

0.309

3.180

βdensity(hi)

2.699

0.742

1.332

4.259
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Table 3.2. Risk prediction table from our decision model showing estimated probability of pneumonia epizootics, Pr(Epizootic), for
portfolios evaluated for the Petty Creek herd of bighorn sheep. Decision-makers predicted how portfolios (i.e., potential decisions)
would affect the risk factors identified by the Sells et al. (2015) risk model. The table provided corresponding Pr(Epizootic) for 1-yr
and long-term timeframes (5 years for Petty Creek).
R Inputs (Predicted Impact on Risk Factors):

Pr(Epizootic)

Pr(Epizooticlong-term )
CRIa:

Private Weed Control

Neighbor Risk

Density

Portfolio

Land:

(0-1):

(0-1):

(Lo, Md, or Hi, 0-1)b:

Status Quo

50%

(N/A, 0)

15% impact (0.15)

Hi, 90% impact (0.90)

Transplant Removal

36%

(N/A, 0)

5% impact (0.05)

Lethal Removal

43%

(N/A, 0)

Easement

45%

(N/A, 0)

1-yearc

Long-

10%

90%

termd

CRI

CRI

0.059

0.264

0.149

0.430

Md, 60% impact (0.60)

0.008

0.038

0.020

0.071

10% impact (0.10)

Md, 80% impact (0.80)

0.015

0.072

0.038

0.132

15% impact (0.15)

Hi, 65% impact (0.65)

0.027

0.128

0.071

0.217

a

80% credibility intervals quantify uncertainty for Pr(Epizooticlong-term ).

b

Lo = low, md = medium, hi = high, based on herd-specific range in density from 1979‒2013.

c

Pr(Epizootic1-yr ) = (eLogit risk )⁄(1 + eLogit risk ), where Logit risk = ∑ βi × Ri, based on R inputs and β from the risk model (Table 3.1).

d

Pr(Epizooticlong-term ) = 1 − [1 − Pr(Epizootic1-yr )]yfor y years.
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Table 3.3. Consequence table showing the decision analysis for managing risk of pneumonia epizootics for the Petty Creek herd of
bighorn sheep. The decision-maker predicted consequences for 2 potential outcomes (epizootic and no epizootic). The Transplant
Removal and Lethal Removal portfolios scored highly. Trade-offs, based on weighted scores, are an important consideration in a
decision analysis before selecting a final portfolio to implement.
Fundamental

Persistence

Operating

Personnel

Crisis

Viewing

Hunting

Costs

Costs

Response

Opportunity

Opportunity

Maximize

Minimize

Minimize

Minimize

Maximize

Maximize

Utility

Cost, $K,

Person-days,

Cost, $K,

1=lo, 2=md,

Licenses, #,

long-term

long-term

long-term

3=hib

long-term

Objective:
Goal:
Measurable

Attribute & Scale: [Pr(No epiz.long-term )]a
Portfolio:

Pr(Epizooticlong-term )c:

Consequences, Epizootic:

Status Quo

0.00

37.50

70.00

45.00

2.00

20.00

0.26

Transplant Removal

0.00

75.00

180.00

45.00

2.00

12.50

0.04

Lethal Removal

0.00

75.00

125.00

45.00

2.00

20.00

0.07

Easement

0.00

787.50

370.00

45.00

2.00

50.00

0.13

(continued)
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(continued)
Fundamental

Persistence

Objective:
Portfolio:

Operating

Personnel

Crisis

Viewing

Hunting

Costs

Costs

Response

Opportunity

Opportunity
Pr(No epiz.long-term )d:

Consequences, No Epizootic:

Status Quo

0.28

37.50

70.00

0.00

3.00

40.00

0.74

Transplant Removal

0.56

75.00

180.00

0.00

3.00

25.00

0.96

Lethal Removal

0.48

75.00

125.00

0.00

3.00

40.00

0.93

Easement

0.40

787.50

370.00

0.00

3.00

100.00

0.87

Expected Values (EV)e:

Portfolio:
Status Quo

0.28

37.50

70.00

11.87

2.74

34.73

Transplant Removal

0.56

75.00

180.00

1.73

2.96

24.52

Lethal Removal

0.48

75.00

125.00

3.26

2.93

38.55

Easement

0.40

787.50

370.00

5.75

2.87

93.61

(continued)

98

(continued)
Fundamental

Persistence

Objective:

Operating

Personnel

Crisis

Viewing

Hunting

Costs

Costs

Response

Opportunity

Opportunity

Normalized Values (X')f:

Portfolio:
Status Quo

0.00

1.00

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.15

Transplant Removal

1.00

0.95

0.63

1.00

1.00

0.00

Lethal Removal

0.72

0.95

0.82

0.85

0.85

0.20

Easement

0.43

0.00

0.00

0.60

0.60

1.00

Weighted Scoresg:
Portfolio:

Weights (wi)h:

Overall Scorei:

0.21

0.16

0.17

0.13

0.14

0.19

Status Quo

0.00

0.16

0.17

0.00

0.00

0.03

0.36

Transplant Removal

0.21

0.15

0.11

0.13

0.14

0.00

0.74

Lethal Removal

0.15

0.15

0.14

0.11

0.12

0.04

0.71

Easement

0.09

0.00

0.00

0.08

0.08

0.19

0.44

(continued)
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(continued)
a

Consequences for persistence are based on the decision-maker’s risk attitude toward Pr(Epizooticlong-term ) (Fig. 3.3).

b

Low (lo), medium (md) or high (hi) density.

c

Pr(Epizooticlong-term ) is calculated with the Sells et al. (2015) risk model (Tables 3.1 and 3.2).

d

Pr(No epizooticlong-term ) = 1 ‒ Pr(Epizooticlong-term ).

e

Expected values, EV = ConsequenceEpizootic × Pr(Epizooticlong-term ) + ConsequenceNo epizootic × Pr(No epizooticlong-term ).

f

Normalized values, X' = (x ‒ xmin)/( xmax ‒ xmin) if the goal is to maximize, (x ‒ xmax)/( xmin ‒ xmax) if minimize.

g

Weighted scores = X' × wi and are the final scores for the consequences for each objective, for each portfolio.

h

Weights, wi, are based on swing weighting.

i

Overall scores are summed across each row; higher scores have more support.
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APPENDIX

Table A.1. List of 30 a priori models of risk of pneumonia epizootics for 43 herds of
bighorn sheep in Montana from 1979–2013. Model number, effective number of
parameters (pD), and Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) are provided, with models
sorted by ∆DIC compared to the top-ranked model. Within the distribution of each herd
plus a 14.5-km buffer from that perimeter, allotments = # federally managed sheep and
goat allotments, private land = percentage of private land, weed control = whether the
herd biologist knew of the use of domestic sheep or goats for weed control, and neighbor
risk = whether the herd or a neighboring herd had a pneumonia epizootic previously.
Herd proximity = the average distance to the 3 closest herds. Ram:ewe ratios = ratio of
rams to ewes counted during surveys. Density = the number of individuals counted
divided by the area of each herd’s distribution, assigned into 1 of 3 equally sized bins of
low, medium (md), and high (hi) density relative to the herd’s 1979–2013 percentage of
average. Winter = percentage of normal November‒March precipitation in the herd
distribution. Spring = percentage of normal April‒June precipitation in the herd
distribution. Herd origin = whether the herd was native, mixed, or reintroduced.
∆DIC

#

Model

pD

DIC

19

Private land + Weed control + Neighbor risk + Density

8.5

162.1

0.0

14

Neighbor risk + Density

7.5

169.0

6.9

21

Private land + Neighbor risk + Herd origin

7.9

178.8

16.7

3

Neighbor risk

4.5

179.3

17.2

(continued)
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(continued)
∆DIC

#

Model

pD

DIC

13

Neighbor risk + Winter

5.6

181.4

19.3

15

Weed control + Density

11.8

183.7

21.6

22

Weed control + Proximity + Density + Herd origin

15.0

183.9

21.8

18

Private land + Proximity + Density

12.5

184.6

22.5

20

Private land + Weed control + Proximity

8.1

186.9

24.8

12

Private land + Proximity

8.0

192.1

30.0

4

Weed control

8.2

192.5

30.4

7

Density

14.1

193.6

31.5

16

Weed control + Spring

14.1

194.4

32.3

2

Private land

8.7

197.2

35.1

23

Weed control + Proximity + Winter + Spring

17.1

197.7

35.6

25

Proximity + Density + Spring

26.5

197.8

35.7

5

Proximity

8.5

198.1

36.0

9

Spring

12.3

198.6

36.5

8

Winter

7.9

199.1

37.0

10

Herd origin

10.9

202.5

40.4

27

Allotments + Neighbor risk + Density

54.5

1055.3

893.2

26

Allotments + Private land + Proximity + Spring

58.4

1070.8

908.7

11

Allotments + Private land

56.2

1081.2

919.1

1

Allotments

57.2

1084.6

922.5

29

Allotments + Proximity + Winter + Herd origin

67.7

1096.0

933.9

24

Neighbor risk + Rams + Spring

59.1

1637.4

1475.3

(continued)
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(continued)
DIC

∆DIC

70.3

1659.1

1497.0

61.7

1661.4

1499.3

Global (all 10 covariates)

116.3

2507.9

2345.8

Allotments + Weed control + Rams

108.3

2540.0

2377.9

#

Model

pD

17

Private land + Rams + Density + Winter

6

Rams

30
28
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